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Assimilation of Baloch in Iran and Pakistan and Connections to Political Violence of the Baloch

by

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M.A. Thesis

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A thesis submitted to Khalifa University of Science and Technology in accordance with the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts in International and Civil Security in the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences.



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i. Abstract

Shaima Alblooshi, “**Assimilation of Baloch in Iran and Pakistan and Connections to Political Violence of the Baloch**”, M.A. Thesis, Master of Arts in International and Civil Security, Institute of International and Civil Security, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Khalifa University of Science and Technology, United Arab Emirates, December 2018.

The research employs methods of quantitative analysis, content analysis, and comparative analysis between the Iranian and Pakistani governments approaches to assimilation of their Baloch minorities in order to measure whether they are factors that contribute to political violence by the Baloch in the two countries. The research provides a correlation between independent variable x (x = different approaches to assimilation), and dependent variable y (y = level of political violence). The research extracts information from secondary sources, and longitudinal data on political violence of the Baloch from the Global Terrorism Database and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program. The research largely proves the researcher’s hypothesis that while faulty assimilation policies are a contributing factor towards political violence in both Iran and Pakistan, it is more of a contributing factor in Iran than in the Pakistan.

Indexing Terms: Assimilation, Nationalism, Political Violence

ii. Acknowledgement

This thesis is dedicated to my ancestors who escaped the persecution of the Persian Empire and found a home in the United Arab Emirates. It is dedicated to my mother who continuously supported me throughout my academic journey. I would like to express my deepest gratitude and respect to my advisor and thesis supervisor, Dr. Brendon Cannon, and the faculty of the MA program in International and Civil Security at Khalifa University of Science and Technology for their continuous support and guidance over the course of my Master's degree. Lastly, I would also like to thank my brother, Omar Alblooshi, for reviewing my thesis and tolerating my lack of technical skills in Microsoft Office.

iii. Declaration and Copyright

Declaration

I declare that the work in this thesis was carried out in accordance with the regulations of Khalifa University of Science and Technology. The work is entirely my own except where indicated by special reference in the text. Any views expressed in the thesis are those of the author and in no way represent those of Khalifa University of Science and Technology. No part of the thesis has been presented to any other university for any degree.

Author Name: Shaima Abdulla Alblooshi

Author Signature:

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of a long horizontal line followed by a stylized, cursive flourish that loops back to the left.

Date: 06 December 2018

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Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1 Context to the Topic and Research Problem Description

The Baloch is an Aryan ethnic group that went through several waves of migration before settling in Balochistan. Historical Balochistan comprises the modern-day Pakistani province of Balochistan, the Iranian province of Sistan and Balochistan, and the southern areas of Afghanistan including Nimruz, Helmand and Kandahar provinces. The Baloch landscape covers approximately 690,000 sq. km, with two hundred and eighty thousand (280,000) sq. km in Iran, 350,000 sq. km in Pakistan, and some sixty thousand sq. km. (60,000) in Afghanistan (Dashti, 2012). Since the division of Balochistan by British Colonial powers in 1871, and the gradual annexation of Balochistan by Reza Shah Pahlavi of Iran in 1928 and Pakistan in 1948, the Baloch minorities have caused turmoil in both countries (Dashti, 2012). Since then, there have been calls for succession, nationalism and further political rights. These calls have often manifested in violence and have led to militancy in both modern-day Pakistan and Iran (Ghafari, 2009).

The two largest operating militant groups in the province of Balochistan are the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), and the Baloch Republican Army (BRA). Although the origin of the Balochistan Liberation Army is unclear, it is assumed that it was set up by Baloch tribesmen who were in exile in Afghanistan during the 1980s. Former members of the Baloch Peoples Liberation Front (BPLF) and followers of the Marri tribe, Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri of the Marri tribe, had settled in Afghanistan after an insurgency that broke out between Baloch and the Pakistan government ended in 1977. The government of Pakistan claims that the members of the BLA are mainly composed of Marri tribesmen, however, the tribe denies any affiliations to the group (UCDP, n.a). As for the Baloch Republican Army, the group originated as a private militia of Nawab Akbar Bugti, the previous leader of the Bugti tribe and the Jamhoori Watan Party. After the death of Nawab Bugti in 2006 during an army operation, both the party and the militia regrouped to form the Balochistan Republican Party and Baloch Republican Army, under the leadership of Brahamdagh Bugti, the grandson of Nawab Bugti. Like the Marri tribe, Brahamdagh Bugti denies his tribe's involvement in BRA. He left Pakistan to live in exile in Afghanistan and later moved to Switzerland. Both the BLA and the BRA oppose the Pakistani government and aim to establish separatist groups. In addition, it is vital to note that the Pakistani government has continuously accused the Indian government of supporting Baloch separatist movements (UCDP, n.a). In the research, I focus mainly on

the two mentioned above groups. While there are several groups in the region fighting for the same cause, Balochistan Liberation Army and the Baloch Republican Army are the largest in term of political violence, meaning they are responsible for the largest attacks. In addition, both groups are operated by the largest and most influential Baloch tribes in the region, the Marri and the Bugti.

In terms of Iran's militant groups in Sistan-Balochistan, Jundollah emerged in 2003 and was the only Baloch-led militant group. The group declared their objective of protecting the human rights, culture and faith of the ethnic Baloch people against the government of Iran and has denied separatist intentions. It is estimated that the group comprised of between 1000 and 2000 well-trained fighters. In 2010, the founder of the group, Abdul Malik Rigi, was captured and executed, which eventually lead to the decline of Jundollah's activities (UCDP, n.a). With the decaying condition of Jundollah, members of the militia regrouped to form two separate sub-groups in 2012: Harakat Ansar Iran and Jaish Al Adl. Harakat Ansar Iran was only active for the year 2012-2013 (Merat, 2014), whereas Jaish Al Adl continues to be relatively active in Iran. Unlike its predecessor, Jaish Al Adl is concerned with defending the human rights of all Sunnis, within and outside the borders of Iran. The research focuses only on active Baloch-led militant groups. Currently, Jaish Al Adl is the only active group. However, Jundollah was the only active militant group between the years 2003 – 2010.

Unlike Pakistan, the militant group in Iran is reportedly suspected of receiving support from Saudi Arabia, the Mossad and the CIA (Feroz, 2015). This is due to the fact that these foreign powers are not in favor of Iran's policies and are threatened by its behavior. In addition, unlike Pakistan, Tehran has not exploited the Baloch region or excavated for resources. It keeps the region in an underdeveloped status to further impede its movement. Balochistan has the lowest per capita income in Iran, with 80 percent living under the poverty line (Zurutuza, 2011). In addition, interviewed Baloch explain that after the annexation of Balochistan in 1928, Shia missionaries sent by Tehran explained that unless the Baloch converted, there would be little opportunities and jobs made available to them.

In an attempt to reconcile the violence caused by Baloch militant groups, both Pakistan and Iran have taken assimilation measurements at one level or the other. Despite their attempts to quell the call for nationalism, Baloch minorities continue to express their desire to reclaim their rule over Balochistan (Ghafari, 2009). The call for nationalism has been fueled by factors such as low social development in the respective Baloch regions, weak physical infrastructures, unemployment rates, and electoral representation. In both

regions, the Baloch are deprived of practicing their culture and are banned from using their ethnic language as a medium of instruction at schools. Both countries refuse to adhere to the Baloch demands and continue to exert heightened security over the Baloch regions (Ghafari, 2009; Khan, 2009). In addition, both countries continue to execute Baloch nationals as a means of control (Naseer, 2017). As a result, violence against Iran and Pakistan continues by Baloch separatists and, at present, the situation remains unsettled and unresolved.

1.2 Problem Statement and its Significance

Historical Balochistan is strategically located by the Strait of Hormuz and the Arabian Gulf. In the past, western forces feared that Russia would use Balochistan as a gateway to the Indian Ocean (Dashti, 2012). In addition, Pakistan is a nuclear-armed country, the widespread presence of non-state violent actors could pose a threat should one of these groups acquire nuclear materials or technology. Another reason of significance is that many of these militant groups find refuge in India, this could further aggravate the situation between India and Pakistan, both of whom possess nuclear weapons, and two who are major allies to the UAE. As a Sunni majority group, the UAE can build allegiance with the Baloch in Iran as a way of having influence within Iran. This prospect can be supported through the historical relationship between the country, where there is a large number of Baloch diaspora living in the UAE and in the GCC as a whole. Additionally, success in Baloch independence could serve as a leverage towards regaining the occupied UAE islands, as less of the Arabian Gulf would be accessible to Iran. Therefore, it is in the national interest of the UAE to understand the extent and severity of the Baloch national movement. Although both Iran and Pakistan have attempted at one level or the other to assimilate the Baloch minorities into the society, failure to assimilate has led to nationalist violence by Baloch militant groups in both countries. Therefore, it is necessary to study the significance and effectiveness of assimilation approaches taken by both the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in order to create a greater understanding. In addition, there is a gap in the available literature on assimilation approaches of the Baloch minority. The produced literature will not only serve as a means to expand on the topic of Baloch nationalism, but it can also be used later as a reference for further research on ethnic nationalism.

1.3 Research Objectives

1.3.1 Statement of Research Aims

To employ methods of comparative analysis between the Iranian and Pakistani approaches to the assimilation of their Baloch minorities in order to measure whether it is a factor that contributes towards Baloch nationalism in the two countries. The research will examine secondary sources, this includes literature available on Khalifa University online database that focuses on Nationalism theories, assimilation theories, Baloch in Iran, and Baloch in Pakistan. In addition, the thesis relies on six main books, they are: *the Baloch Conflict with Iran and Pakistan* by Naseer Dashti, *Baloch and Balochistan* by Naseer Dashti, *Imagined Communities* by Benedict Anderson, *the Nation in History* by Anthony D. Smith, *the Ethnic Origin of Nations* by Anthony D. Smith, *A Cry for Justice* by Kaiser Bengali. The research will also examine news articles from sources such as Dawn and BBC. In addition, information on attack incidents in Iran and Pakistan will be extracted from the Global Terrorism Database (<https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/>) – which is maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland – and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (<http://ucdp.uu.se/>) – which is maintained by the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at the Uppsala University.

1.3.2 Research Question

Explanatory Question: To what extent are the differences in the Iranian and Pakistani approaches to assimilation of their Baloch minorities a factor in the level of political violence in the two countries? This will be done though employing secondary resources, and examining grey literature.

1.3.3 Research Hypothesis

Assimilation approaches of Baloch minority in the Islamic Republic of Iran have contributed to Baloch political violence more than they have in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

1.3.4 Variables, Concepts and Indicators

For the purpose of this research, the independent variable x will be measured as different approaches to assimilation, whereas the dependent variable y will be measured

level of political violence. The indicators that I will use to measure independent variable x (x = different approaches to assimilation) will be:

- Public Investment in Balochistan: dreary socioeconomic conditions can serve as a trigger for violence against the government, specifically if perceived in greater lengths among the minority ethnic groups within a country. This information will be retrieved from available statistical data on income, and other socioeconomic indicators
- Political Representation: lack of political representation can lead ethnic minorities to feel left out from a wider national framework, hence prompting stronger ethnic sentiment
- Natural Mineral wealth redistribution: the Baloch province is rich in minerals, it is important to measure whether the governments of Iran and Pakistan have been extracting wealth from the regions and redistributing the wealth back into the region.
- Social Welfare Discrimination: compare the poverty level in Balochistan with other provinces in Iran and Pakistan, civil services on offer, and suppression of ethnic language
- Government response to the Baloch Nationalist Movement: to examine the nature of the government of Iran and Pakistan response to the Baloch National Movement, or political violence by the Baloch.

As for dependent variable y (y = level of political violence), the indicators below will be extracted from the Global Terrorism Database and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program:

- Total incidents: count of all incidents of attacks occurring in Balochistan (in Iran; in Pakistan) from 2004 to 2017;
- State-based violence: all attacks by organized Baloch groups (non-state armed actors) against the state (in Iran; in Pakistan), regardless of whether the target was military or non-military;
- One-sided violence: all incidents of premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by Baloch groups (in Iran; in Pakistan);
- Non-state Violence: Attacks against other non-state groups

Sources of data will include:

- Grey literature: Material produced outside traditional academic journals
- Primary sources: Global Terrorism Database, Uppsala

Secondary sources: academic literature written by credible authors and researchers

1.3.5 Research Stages

Table 1: Research Element

Research Element
Introduction
Academic Literature Review
Research Design
Results
Discussion
Conclusion and Final Submission

1.4 Limitations of Expected Findings

Reliability examines the replicability of the research and the correctness of the methodology. The information used for the research is mainly extracted from historical events, from secondary literature review, and from the Global Terrorism Database and Uppsala Conflict Data Program. Therefore, replicability is guaranteed given that the prospect researcher will rely on similar sources. However, it is essential to note that there are limits to the reliability of the research given that the some of the resources used might lack credibility given that they are made available by the Pakistani (score 117/180 in the corruption perception index for the year 2017) and the Iranian government (score 130/180 in the corruption perception index for the year 2017)

Validity examines whether the research is likely to achieve the outcomes it set out to achieve. Given that most of the resources are made available with regards to Baloch nationalism and assimilation in Iran and Pakistan, it is most likely that the research will be valid and successful in achieving its research aim. The research will positively prove the correlation between the dependent variable (level of political violence) and the independent variable (different approaches to assimilation). The result of the findings can be used in later research when addressing Baloch political violence or Baloch nationalism. However, due to the sensitivity of the subject in both Iran and Pakistan, both states most likely choose to withhold demographic and economic information on Baloch that could further feed into the research.

Generalizability examines whether the findings are applicable in other research settings. Given that the findings are going to be limited to Baloch in Iran and Pakistan,

however, there are several cases where minority groups are living in a similar context (ex; Kurds in Iraq and Turkey). Therefore, the methodology used in my research can be reused, and my findings can be referenced for benchmarking purposes or comparative analysis. This positively impacts the generalizability of my research. Other limitations on my research are my inability to interview Baloch in Pakistan or Iran or to conduct a survey/poll. This is due to the travel restriction imposed on UAE citizens, specifically those working in the diplomatic corps.

1.5 Structure of Thesis

Table 2: Structure of Thesis

Chapter	Major Elements	Detailed Elements
Front Matters		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Title Page ▪ Author's Declaration ▪ Abstract
Chapter 1	Introduction	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Context to the Topic ▪ Problem state and its significance ▪ Research Objectives ▪ Structure of the Thesis
Chapter 2	Academic Literature Review	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The location of the problem in Academic Literature ▪ Sections on Relevant Literature
Chapter 3	Research Design	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Research approach ▪ Methods ▪ Limitations of findings ▪ Ethical issues
Chapter 4	Results	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Sections on data analysis and findings
Chapter 5	Discussion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Sections on the key findings in the context of the research questions and literature
Chapter 6	Conclusion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Implications ▪ Future research directions ▪ Recommendations ▪ Research Reflections

Chapter 2 Literature Review

2.1 Nationalism and a Nation

The literature available on nationalism and nation-states often posits that nationalism and the idea of the “nation” is a social construct that is brought to life through a common bond shared by the people. Among the various literature lies two basic ideas: 1) that a nation is a result of a pre-existing state, or 2) that it is not. In addition, it is necessary to highlight that in the past, primordial and perennial perspectives on nationalism existed. Researchers believe that nations could be traced throughout history, and that every group of person has a historical nation-based lineage. Authors such as Benedict Anderson and Ernest Gellner argued from a perspective of modernism, whereas Anthony Smith argued in line with the neo-perennial camp.

Smith explained in *The Nation in History* (2000) that perennialism has lost its popularity, and that the dominant orthodoxy is thoroughly modernist. He stated that modernists contend that nations and national identities are recent, and that they are a product of modernization and modernity. However, Smith explained that modernists often fail to draw the distinction between a state, a nation-state, and a nation. Smith then provided a counter-argument to the modernist claims. He explained that nations are formed on the basis of ethnic memories of the past, belief in a common ancestry, a link with a homeland, and a measure of solidarity. He also articulated the difference between an “ethnie” and a “nation”, explaining that ethnies are based on ancestry myths and historical memories whereas nations are based on historical territory, public cultures and common law. Unlike an ethnie, public culture encompasses all members of the group in a nation. This allowed nations to develop beyond a single ethnie and eventually incorporate many other ethnies to form a nation (Smith, 2000).

While Smith’s theory on nationalism and what constitutes a nation may fail to fully convince the reader as to how modernists fail to draw the distinction between a state, a nation-state, and a nation, his theory on the necessity of ethnies in creating a nation is highly applicable in the case of Balochistan and the Baloch. This is because historically the territory of Balochistan incorporated the Balaschik (original Baloch ethnie) and other ethnies who migrated along with the Baloch or who were the original settlers of the land that was to become Balochistan. However, the Balaschik or the Baloch culture became the public culture, and hence all the ethnies were incorporated into the nation of Balochistan (Dashti, 2012).

Ernest Gellner's (1983) theory on nationalism has stood at the center of studies on nationalism. He defined nationalism as a political principle where political and national

units should be congruent. He stated that as societies move from an agrarian society to an industrial society, a high culture pervades the whole society, and this culture needs to be maintained by politics. When people from different backgrounds and historically different castes began to congregate into cities, it was necessary to create a form of common identity for them. He further explained that it was necessary for capitalistic purposes that employers and employees have a common language in order to engage and work with one another. Gellner explained that the need to politically control people as well as protect the capitalist market led to the creation of a sense of common identity. This created a sense of nationality that made those who lived in the industrialized age not only work hard for themselves but for their nation as well.

While Gellner's theory is applicable to countries such as the United Arab Emirates, which is inhabited by citizens from different ethnic and tribal backgrounds who came together under a wider sense of Emirati nationality, it is less applicable to the case of Balochistan. Rather than industrialization, the Baloch began to develop their sense of nationality as a means of security and migration. The Baloch were continuously persecuted by successive Persian empires, by the Arabs, and by neighboring tribes. As a result, they converged together against the persecution of foreign powers, such as the Persians and the Arabs (Dashti, 2012).

Thongchai Winichakul (1994) did impeccable research on the topic of nationalism. According to Winichaku, there is no affiliation about pre-existing countries and nationalism. As a matter of fact, he alluded to the truth that a nation can be referred to as an imagined community and therefore should be defined by recognizing the nation as an entity of its own rather than referring to it as a tangible bond (Hutchinson, 2017).

However, it is essential to point that while Winichakul stated that there is no affiliation about pre-existing countries and nationalism, the case for Balochistan tends to differ. Balochistan is a pre-existing nation that turned into a short-lived state from 1947 to 1948. The independence of Balochistan came to an end in 1948 with its invasion by Pakistan. Since then, the Baloch have called on nationalism and continue to conduct attacks against the government of Pakistan and Iran (Dashti, 2012).

Benedict Anderson made a similar claim in his book, *Imagined Communities* (1983). Anderson explained that a nation is a socially constructed community that is imagined by a group of people who perceive themselves to be within the same group (Anderson, 1983). He explained that nationalism can refer to the fabrication and creation of a bond that was inexistent in the society (Breuilly, 2017). The bond is created on an imagined state and the imagined state can be either sovereign or inherited. However, Anderson's

perception of the whole idea of nationalism is based on the idea that there must be a bond that is shared by people of an ethnic group or a combination of many ethnic groups on a basic level in order to establish this “imagined community”.

While the theory of an “imagined community” made by Winichakul and Anderson are widely inapplicable to the case for Baloch, it makes sense in term of stating that there must be a bond between a single or multiple ethnic groups on a basic level. As explained in his book *The Baloch and Balochistan* (2012), Dashti explained that the Baloch originally migrated from Central Asia along with other ethnic groups for a period that spanned through 600 BC to the seventeenth century, However, long before the establishment of Balochistan, a sense of nationalism began to develop between those who adopted Balochi as their lingua franca, regardless of their ethnic origin. Today, over 14 million individuals in West, South and Central Asia alone identify as Baloch (Dashti, 2012).

Anderson focused on the theory of print capitalism, which he stated is the driver of national consciousness. He explained that by the year 1500, over 20 million books were printed and spread throughout Europe. One of the earliest capital enterprises were printers and international publishing houses. It was a profitable industry and was mainly accessible by the wealthy. Initially, these books were sold in Latin which created a strong sense of Christendom within Europe. However, in the seventeenth century, the number of Latin speakers were reduced immensely which meant that fewer books were being sold. In order to ensure their business continuity, capitalists began publishing books in vernaculars that were being spoken instead of Latin. Anderson explained that this allowed people to develop a sense of “nationality” based on the vernaculars that they spoke. In summary, Anderson’s theory of print capitalism stated that the convergence of capitalism, printing, and the popularity of vernacular languages ultimately led to the birth of national consciousness. Print-capitalism created mass readerships, shrunk the wide-range of spoken dialects into a smaller number of print-languages, and produced vernacular administrative languages that eventually replaced Latin (ex; France).

There are arguably many flaws in Anderson’s theory, mainly that it lacked generalizability. While his theory works for the cases of Europe and Latin America, it is less likely to yield results in South and Central Asia and specifically to the case of the Baloch. Historically, the Baloch have identified with an ethnic or national identity since the seventh century when they first began migrating as a group into what eventually constituted Balochistan. This – as explained through the lenses of primordial

nationalism – is because of their common ancestry myths, historical memories, and their adherence to a public culture. Their sense of identity further consolidated once they adopted Balochi as the lingua franca, given that Balochi was not a written language until the nineteenth century (Dames, 1922). Therefore, Anderson's theory of print capitalism is inapplicable in the case of the Baloch.

In his article *Imagined Communities Reconsidered* (2001), Peter Wagon evaluated Anderson's theory. He stated that despite Anderson's focus and emphasis on the importance of print and print-capitalism in establishing nationalism, Anderson indirectly drew on the importance of orality without incorporating it into his overall theory of nationalism. To elaborate, Anderson made a connection between emotions and oral language, and between print and cognition. In other words, "oral language provides the emotional attachments that inspire sacrifice for the nation, whereas print merely provides an enabling condition" (Wagon, 2001). However, although Anderson indirectly highlighted the importance of oral languages for fueling passion, his theory mainly revolved around print capitalism.

Like Gellner and Smith, Wagon also explained that oral language is as important as print-capitalism. This is apparent in the case for Baloch, where once Baloch settled in Balochistan, the fact that Balochi became the lingua franca of the area was an enabler for other groups that lived in the area to be incorporated into the Baloch group.

Additionally, since Balochi was an oral language until the 20th century (with earliest traces of manuscript dating to the 19th century), one can interpret that oral language played a significant role (Brown, Ogilvie, 2009).

Finally, there are academics who stood at the very opposing side of the spectrum on nationalism. According to Eric Hobsbawm (1992), the conception that a nation is entirely inherent is based on illogical premises that have no grounds whatsoever. In his view, nations are only perceived as nations if they share political, social and technological transformations. He stated that nations are a modern construction and that they are not unchanging social entities. Therefore, similarity within a group of people is not a reason enough to justify the presence of nations.

Like Gellner and Anderson, Hobsbawm also emphasized the importance of language in creating a common identity. He defined nationalism as a sufficiently large entity of individuals whose members view themselves as a nation or want to receive such treatment. He alluded to the fact that nationalism can be pre-existing and there is reasonable doubt to believe that nationalism as a whole idea is based on the feeling that a group of people has with regards to the larger picture that represents them in the

global map. This theory of nationalism could be applied on the case of Baloch, given that there has been a call for nationalism long before a Baloch state ever existed. Many scholars have associated the aforementioned views of the subject of nationalism as deep constructs. As a matter of fact, according to Hutchinson (2017), the fact that a group of people might share similar characteristics does not guarantee the fact they belong to a nation. Rather, the bond between the people is what forms the nation.

2.2 Theories of Assimilation

In this research, assimilation can be defined as the process of integration of a minority group into a wider culture. It is necessary to note that most of the literature on assimilation was written in the twentieth century and therefore might not be up to date with current assimilation trends. In the literature, there appear to be four main models that continue to appear either as a whole, or partly: the Classic Assimilation Model, the New Assimilation model, the Ethnic Disadvantage Assimilation Model, and the Segmented Assimilation Model.

The Classic Assimilation Model is summarized in Gordon's (1964) seven stages of assimilation. The seven stages are acculturation, the adaptation of the ethnic group to the language, clothes, and culture of the host society. Structural assimilation, the entrance of the minority group into institutions in the host society. Marital assimilation, which is widespread intermarriage between the minority and majority groups. Identification assimilation, where the minority group begins to identify with the larger dominant culture. Attitude reception assimilation, where the reciprocal prejudice disappears between minority and majority groups. Behavior reception assimilation, which refers to the disappearing of discrimination towards the minority group. And finally, a civic assimilation which occurs when power struggles disappear (Gordon, 1964). While in theory, it seems ideal, it is most difficult to find a single society where prejudice and discrimination cease to exist within a nation. Therefore, Gordon's theory is rarely applicable in reality.

In their research, Williams and Ortega (1990) examined Gordon's theory in addition to theories that have made references to Gordon's theory of the seven steps of assimilation. They noted that Gordon's theory is yet to be tested on its accuracy. They elaborated by probing the literature of those who examined his work, stating that while researchers have acknowledged Gordon's work, they have mainly used one or two of his measures of assimilation (Williams; Ortega, 1990). They concluded that different ethnic groups have different patterns of assimilation. For the purpose of answering the

research question, it is unrealistic to apply Gordon's theory given that both Iran and Pakistan are different states with different policies, and the grievances in Balochistan (Pakistan) and Balochistan (Iran) vary slightly. Therefore, as Williams and Ortega state, each will most likely have different patterns of assimilation.

In his article, Jones (1967) used Australia as a case study for ethnic assimilation. He concluded that assimilation varies between ethnic groups based on the skills they bring, their language, religion, and physical characters. In addition, the native-born Australians tend to accept immigrants who adopt the "Australian way of life" much faster than they would other immigrants. His studies also concludes that ethnic residencies tend to recreate their culture within Australia and that he expected these groups will eventually disperse into the wider Australian scene. However, he highlighted that the rate of dispersion will differ from one immigrant to the group (Jones, 1967). This theory coincides with Williams and Ortega who state that each ethnic group will most likely have different patterns of assimilation.

The New Assimilation Model attempts to rectify Gordon's classic model. Alba and Nee (2003) argued that certain institutions play an important role in acquiring assimilation. They exemplified with the Jewish organizations that successfully convinced the New York City Council in 1946 to threaten the tax-exempt status of higher education institutions that were discriminatory. In this way, they secured a passageway towards their assimilation into the U.S education scene. Like Jones, Alba and Nee also argued that successful assimilation involves change and acceptance by the majority or mainstream population (Alba & Nee, 2003) (Alba & Nee, 1990). It is necessary to note however that both the classic and new assimilation models portray immigrants and native-born people following a straight-line, and that eventually immigrants become part of the straight-line and become similar in terms of culture, norms, and characteristics.

In *Beyond the Melting Point* (1963), Glazer and Moynihan argued for the ethnic disadvantage model which states that assimilation of many ethnic groups is blocked. They explained that even if the immigrant group or minority group acquires the culture or language, discrimination and institutional barriers in employment and other parts of the political and economic sectors block complete assimilation (Glazer & Moynihan, 1963). This theory of assimilation, more than the others, is applicable to the case of Balochistan. The Baloch continue to struggle from discrimination, or perceived discrimination in some instances, in the political and economic realm that leads to their feelings of isolation from the greater population. While they have adopted many

aspects of the Pakistani and Iranian culture, such as the language and food, many continue to feel distanced from a wider Pakistani or Iranian identity (Dashti, 2017).

Finally, one of the most popular theories of assimilation is the Segmented Assimilation Model. Zhou and Portes (1993) explained that assimilation does not necessarily have to occur in a straight line. They theorized that different immigrant groups experience different obstacles and barriers, and the more severe the barriers are, the more likely that immigrant groups will follow downward mobility away from assimilation. In Zhou and Portes's theory, they focused on identifying the contextual, structural and cultural factors that separate the different types of assimilation, whether positive, negative or unsuccessful. They continued by stating that these groups with large disadvantages and obstacles might adopt an oppositional nature. This is more likely found in the second generation of immigrants (Portes & Zhou, 1993). While the Baloch are not considered immigrant, this is present in the case of Balochistan where the children who witnessed the atrocities committed by the Pakistani military against the Baloch during the 1973-1978 insurgency have become more nationalized and more violent than their parents before them. Children then are now prominent leaders of the current Baloch conflict (Kupecz, 2012).

2.3 Baloch and Balochistan

2.3.1 History of Baloch and Balochistan

Generally, it is critical to identify the history and origin of the Baloch people before delving into studying their nationalism. This section largely relies on the works of Nasser Dahsti who wrote two books which examine the origin of the Baloch: *The Baloch and Balochistan* and *The Baloch Conflict with Iran and Pakistan* (2017). However, it is necessary to note that Dashti exhibited bigotry in his production and used words such as "uncivilized" to describe Bedouin Arabs. In addition, Dashti explained that there is little documentation available on the history of the Baloch and that his theories are based on connecting several historical accounts.

Due to the scarcity of detailed accounts, the ethnic origin and the exact location of the Baloch ancestral homeland is still unknown, this is mainly due to the pastoralist and nomadic nature of historic Baloch. This scarcity led to the rise of several speculations concerning the origin of the Baloch. However, during a later part of the twentieth century, extensive research was made with regards to languages in the Iranian plateau. The intensive research cleared all other theories on Baloch origins with the theory that the Baloch are an Indo-Iranic tribe prevailing over all others. In addition,

from research done on language, researchers have deduced that the Baloch migrated with other Indo-Iranic tribes from central Asia towards the Caspian Sea region sometime around 1200 B.C. Dashti believes that the original area of their settlement was Balashagan, an area that was listed as a northwestern province by the Sassanid Empire. The author explains that the Balaschik (Baloch) were not the only inhabitants of Balashagan, other groups such as the Cyrtii (Kurds), Caspians and Mardis were also inhabitants of the ancient land (Dashti, 2012). The Balaschik coexistence with other ethnic groups influenced the Balochi culture as well as language. However, after continuous atrocities committed against the Baloch, the ethnic group began a series of migration into an area that eventually became known as Balochistan. This area was inhabited with other ethnic groups as well that were eventually incorporated into the Baloch larger culture, this coincides with Smith's theory on nationalism and the formation of a nation.

According to the map below¹, historical Balochistan comprises the modern-day Pakistani province of Balochistan, the Iranian province of Sistan and Balochistan, and



the southern areas of Afghanistan including Nimruz, Helmand and Kandahar provinces. The Baloch landscape covers approximately 690,000 sq. km, with two hundred and eighty thousand (280,000) sq. km in Iran, 350,000 sq. km in Pakistan, and some sixty thousand sq. km. (60,000) in Afghanistan. Balochistan historically controlled more than 900 miles of the Arabian coastline and the Arabian Gulf. It was a borderland between India and Iran and a bridge between the Iranian plateau and the Arabian Peninsula. This puts Balochistan in a strategic location that could be utilized by both Iran and Pakistan.

¹ Image retrieved from <https://balochlinguist.wordpress.com/2014/07/01/balochistan-the-strategic-pearl/>

Today, the Baloch refers to a group of people who occupied historical Balochistan, which in modern day has been split into provinces found in Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. Since the independence of Pakistan and the invasion of Balochistan by Pakistan in 1948, the Baloch have been associated with instability, conflict, and a strong sense of nationality. According to Hutchnson, (2017), it has been hard and dangerous to regain back what they have always perceived as their ancestral or homeland. Studying Baloch nationalism reveals a lot of crucial information about the effects of nationalism; war. As a matter of fact, the unrest that has always been experienced in Baloch can be attributed back to when Balochistan was annexed in 1948 during the Kalat State (Hutchnson, 2017). As a result, there had been four main periods of Baloch insurgencies; 1948, 1962-69, 1974-1999 and 2004. These insurgencies were also promoted by the oppression perceived by Baloch in both Iran and Pakistan.

2.3.2 Baloch Nationalism and Assimilation in Pakistan

Insurgencies in Balochistan occurred over five main periods, 1948, 1958, 1963-1969, 1973-1977, 2004-current. As explained in the methodology chapter, the research will mainly focus on the current conflict which started in 2004. In addition, the research mainly focuses on attacks conducted by the two largest groups in Pakistan, the Baloch Liberal Army, and the Baloch Republican Army. However, the other four conflicts will be briefly summarized for the purpose of creating a logical timeline.

The first insurgency occurred after Pakistan's invasion of the Baloch princely state, Khan of Kalat, in 1948. The Princes refused to lay down arms and continued to fight back until 1950. The second insurgency broke out in 1958 after Pakistan implemented the One Unit policy, which significantly decreases tribal leader's representation in the government. The Third conflict insurgency came to rise in 1963 as a result of the new constitution that was implemented in 1956, which limits provincial autonomy and because of the exploitation of natural gas in Balochistan by the Pakistani government (Bansal, 2008). This led to the creation of Baloch separatist movements. The insurgency spread over 72,000 kilometers. In 1970, the central government abolished the "one unit" policy, which led to the recognition of Balochistan as a province in Pakistan. The fourth insurgency rose in 1973 and lasted until 1977, it was a deadly insurgency that caused the death of around 5,300 Baloch militants and 3,300 Pakistani troops (Kupecz, 2012). The fifth and ongoing conflict broke out in late 2004 and was further aggravated by the rape of a female Baloch doctor at the Sui gas facility

(Kucecz, 2012). The nature of insurgencies clearly indicates that Baloch violence is derived by both a sense of oppression and nationalism.

While nationalism could be a factor in the amount of political violence in Balochistan, authors such as Sigelman and Simpson (1977) explained that economic inequality leads to political violence. However, they explicated that profound economic inequality may produce only minimal political effects. But when it intersects and cross-cuts social, and cultural cleavages, the potential for political violence is greatly enhanced (Sigelman & Simpson, 1977). In the case of Balochistan, it is apparent that there is an intersection between social, economic, and cultural cleavages topped with a sense of nationalism, hence leading to a continuous political violence. To exemplify, in his book *A Cry for Justice* (2018), economist Kaiser Bengali defined and used five indicators of injustice in the Balochistan region controlled by Pakistan: gas grievance, development deficit, social protection deficit, an imbalance in services, and representational imbalances. He identified that there are grievances, or at least perceived grievances, in each of the five indicators. For example, in protest to Pakistan exploitation of Balochistan's natural gas, Baloch militants continue to sabotage gas pipelines. Since 2005, there have been 232 attacks on the gas pipeline (South Asia Terrorism Portal, 2018).

Bengali (2018) proved that while Balochistan is the largest and richest province in terms of natural resources, it continued to be the most underdeveloped province with no major public investments since the 1990s. He also presented data in terms of social protection, where despite Balochistan being the most underdeveloped region, its share of assistance was less than the population share of Pakistan. While the book is interesting, the author occasionally failed to draw a difference between “actual oppression” and “perceived oppression”. To elaborate, while the author accurately states that Balochistan receives only 17 seats in the National Assembly out of a total of 342 seats due to a small population size – which weakens the case for Balochistan in voting – the author failed to mention that this standard for many parliamentary systems where each province or state are given seats based on population size, including the UAE. Therefore, while this is not “actual oppression”, it could be labeled as perceived oppression given the fact that Balochistan accounts for 44 percent of Pakistan’s territory and therefore has more land to be concerned with.

In his article, Gare (2006) explained that the reasons behind Baloch nationalism are firstly expropriation, where he provided evidence (that coincides with evidence provided by Bengali as well) that proved that Balochistan is the smallest beneficiary of

its own natural gas deposits in Sui. The government in Islamabad is also planning to use Balochistan as a transit site for a proposed Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline as well. Secondly, marginalization, specifically with regards to the construction of Gwadar port, the region's only deepwater port, is completely under the control of the central government and has little to no Baloch input. The Baloch are not benefiting from the port, not even in terms of job creation. To elaborate, out of the 600 jobs created, only 100 low-wage jobs were filled by Baloch. In addition, there has been no effort to train the local population to manage the port.

Gare's last reason is dispossession, where the Pakistani government has plans to construct military garrisons in the three most sensitive areas of Balochistan—Sui, Gwadar, and Kohlu in the Marri Tribe area, to which most of the nationalists belong. The Baloch already feel as though they are being completely controlled by Punjab. Unlike Bengali, Gare stated that the above reasons have strengthened the Baloch desire for their own state or at least autonomy over their province (Gare, 2006).

Gare continued by discussing the nature of Baloch nationalism. He explained, like Anthony Smith (2000), that the shared memory of a common past between the Baloch have kept their sense of nationalism awake. This is reflected in the unity of the three largest tribes, the Bugti, Mengal, and Marri, despite their serious differences. He explained that initially, Balochistan was more focused on autonomy rather than independence, but the youth who grew up during the 1973-1977 insurgency, which led to more than five thousand deaths among the Baloch insurgents and almost three thousand among the Pakistan Army, felt evermore isolated from Pakistan, and hence began pushing for independence. Gare also noted that the national movement is driven by a middle class that is underrepresented in the Pakistani administration and army, especially in the higher ranks. Bengali (2018) makes a similar claim in his book, where he stated the government has found a loophole in ensuring a smaller representation of Baloch in the federal government. However, while Gare provides a great summary of the Balochistan national movement, the date with regards to the movement is mainly focused on the period before 2004 despite being written in 2006. Given the gap in time, this thesis will focus mainly on years 2004-2017.

The issue of low Baloch representation within the military and politics has created a general sense of alienation amongst the Baloch. The Baloch perceive the military as non-representative of Baloch interests due to it being mainly dominated by the Punjabi, the largest ethnic group in Pakistan and accounting for almost 45 percent of the population. That coincides with what Gare and Bengali explained with regards to the

low representation of Baloch. However, as previously stated, while this makes sense in terms of perceived oppression, realistically it takes simple math to understand that since the Punjab are the majority of the population, it is only natural for them to have the largest representation in the military and politics (Kupecz, 2012).

Kupecz (2012) argued that the military's harsh response to Baloch nationalism has led to a spiral of violence. This claim is seconded by the International Crisis Group, which explained in their article *The Forgotten Conflict in Balochistan* (2007) that the attempts to crush these insurgencies have fed Baloch nationalism through i) feeding Baloch disaffection ii) the alienation of Baloch from politics and the military, iii) the imprisonment of civilians without charges and the forced displacement of civilians. In his article for the Asian Survey, Khan argued that the militarized Pakistani central state continues to view Balochistan as a source of natural resource, pursuing largely military solutions to lingering socioeconomic and political problems, and this further intensifies the sense of nationalism within the Baloch people. However, it is slightly difficult to rely on data provided by Khan (2009) due to the fact that a lot of the data provided by the author finds origins in gray literature and in old data.

The Pakistani government has also used Islam in their favor. To elaborate, historically the Baloch have always had a more secular mindset in comparison with the Persians, Afghan, and Pakistanis. Religion was not politicized and it was within the personal sphere (Dashti, 2017). However, Pakistan managed to introduce religion systematically as a political factor in Baloch society. This can be portrayed in the creation of mosques and religious schools throughout Pakistan since the 1970s, and after the fourth insurgency that ignited in 1973. Dashti stated that the Pakistani government has used religious elements to weaken secularism amongst the Baloch nationalist, and hence weaken the notion of Nationalism amongst the Baloch.

From the literature available, the Pakistani government has done little to assimilate the Baloch into Pakistan. On the contrary, they have attempted to subdue and subsume the Baloch. Their policies have included dividing the Baloch, terrorizing Baloch activists, and introducing religious fundamentalism into the Baloch society (Dashti, 2017). To exemplify, the government of Pakistan managed to successfully create disagreements amongst the leadership in the Baloch nationalist groups. This is done by planting corrupt seeds in the groups, hiring writers to ruin the image of the groups, and creating divisions along sectarian lines. As for terrorizing Baloch activists, the human rights watch has stated that there are hundreds of Baloch activist are being tortured (BBC, 2011). There are many articles on the internet that archive the

disappearance, torture, and death of activists. There are gruesome cases of mutilation and torture that target students, lawyers, and taxi drivers (Walsh, 2011).

2.3.3 Baloch Nationalism and Assimilation in Iran

Balochistan (officially Sistan-Balochistan province) is the largest province in Iran and accounts for more than 11 percent of the land but only 4 percent of the population. Although rich in resources, the province only contributes to less than one percent of the Gross National Product (Doshouki, 2016).

The Baloch struggle against the dominant Farsi-speakers has begun since the days of the Sassanid Persian Empire (226 – 651 AD) where the Shah ordered for the annihilation of the entire ethnic group (Dashti, 2012). Dashti stated that the reasons behind the annihilation are most likely due to Baloch secularism in times when Zoroastrianism was proclaimed as the official religion of the empire. Since then, the Baloch have resisted emerging powers in the region, such as the Qajar and the Pahlavi dynasty. Dashti believed that the reason behind the strong Baloch resistance to emerging powers lies in their sense of national identity, that the resistance was a reaction against encroachments on their status-quo of living independent and traditionally from encroaching powers (Dashti, 2017). It is important however to note that Dashti is a Balochi himself, and might be reflecting his personal view on an ethnic scale.

Since the division of Balochistan by Great Britain in 1871, the Baloch have fiercely resisted assimilation in Iran. The confrontation of the Baloch and the joint forces of Britain and Iran continued into the Twentieth Century. As a response, Iran invaded Bampur, Balochistan in 1928 and suppressed the resistance in a war of attrition that lasted for a year. However, resistance in other parts of Balochistan continued. Eventually, all Baloch tribes that resisted Iran were crushed, and their leaders were executed. The aftermath of the invasion of Balochistan included a vigorous state policy of assimilation of the Baloch into a wider Persian national identity (Dashti, 2017). It is necessary to note that assimilation in Iran has thus begun before that in Pakistan, and therefore has precedence in terms of contribution towards evoking political violence by Baloch.

During the 1970s, the Pahlavi regime created division between Baloch who were operating the resistance in Iraq and Baloch who were in Iran by drawing differences in terms of socioeconomic class. Modern day Iran is creating division by visibly supporting the religious sect of the Baloch resistance in hopes that it could replace the

secular national leadership with a religious one (Dashti, 2017). Religious leadership would be easier to please, given that they would simply demand more rights and representation for Sunnis, rather than dealing with secular nationalists who are calling for autonomy and succession.

Since the Pahlavi regime crushed all Baloch resistance in 1928, the Iranian Empire implement several strategies in dealing with Baloch nationalism. However, rather than successfully assimilating the Baloch into Iran, they created further dissent. In his book *The Baloch Conflict with Iran and Pakistan* (2017), Dashti explained that the Iranian method in dealing with Baloch nationalism revolved around eight strategies: creating division, state terrorism, mass executions, socio-cultural discrimination, collective punishment, assimilation, and changing the demography. All of these mentioned elements are vital to the research, given that they help explain how assimilation in Iran contributed to political violence.

Iran has been very brutal in terms of controlling the Baloch. They have condoned the Baloch to mass executions, torture, extra-judicial killings, and whatever legal means possible to eliminate the Baloch (ex; prosecution by speedy trials). For example, The Iran Rights Transparency published in 2016 that the Iranian government conducted mass male executions in at least four villages in Balochistan for the year 2016 (Ekhtiar, 2016). Another example is the execution of 16 Baloch political prisoners by the Iranian government in Zahedan, where the prisoners were killed as an act of vengeance against the attack on border security guards in Balochistan (Balochwarna, 2013). Dashti explained that a special force, the Mersad, is used to indiscriminately harass the Baloch in order to settle fear. Another method used by the government to instill fear in the Baloch is collective punishment. Another point raised by Dashti is the socio-cultural discriminations against the Baloch in Iran, where he states that the Baloch are denied the right to speak their language in schools and in work places, as well as little representation in the government (Dashti, 2017).

Dashti explained that Iran's attempt to assimilate their minority has been through ruthless coercion. Their methods include systematic attacks on the Baloch cultural identity, suppression of the language and reinforcing the idea of Baloch being simply tribes within a wider Iranian identity. Those who resisted the forced assimilation were prosecuted and condemned. The Iranian have also used the education system to deny the Baloch of their ethnic identity and to implement upon them an Iranian identity. Another way in which the Iranian state has attempted to force an overarching Persian identity on the Baloch is through weakening Sunni influence and facilities in Iran.

Shi'ism has become a huge part of the Iranian identity and discouraging Sunni practices while encouraging Shi'a practices can be seen as a method of assimilation (Dashti, 2017). Like the Pakistani approach, Iran has also used religion as a weapon to weaken national sentiment.

While Dashti stated that the Baloch movement in Iran is due to a sense of nationalism that has been amplified through the continuous oppression of the Baloch minority, Ghaffari (2009) proposed a different view. According to Ghaffari, Baloch militancy in Iran is a result of preferential treatment for the Shi'a majority. She stated that it is not the desire to restore Balochistan that drives Baloch militancy in Iran, but rather it is the perception of being treated as second-class citizens that cause unrest amongst the Baloch in Iran. While this argument is very logical, Baloch in Pakistan are oppressed by the government as well, yet they have sought independence and formed the Baloch Liberal Army since the annexation of Balochistan in 1948 (Ghaffari, 2009). In his article, Zambelis (2006) argued that the Baloch see themselves as part of a larger Baloch community that crosses Pakistan and Afghanistan, which is referred to as "greater Balochistan". Like Dashti, Zambelis stated that the Baloch historical narrative is constructed by a sense of oppression by foreign nations and colonial power. While the Baloch in Pakistan are focused on their ethnic identity, the Baloch in Iran share a different struggle. He explained that Baloch nationalists in Iran use Sunni dialogue to emphasize their dissimilarity Shiite-dominated Iran as an oppressed and disadvantaged ethnic and religious minority. Zambelis also explained that Iran's suppression of the Baloch through deployments of special and regular army units is only resulting in further grievances. As explained by Dashti as well, Iran's method of assimilation with the Baloch has always been violent and forced. In addition, and as noted by Zambeli, there is not a lot of information available online on the Baloch nationalism in Iran for political reasons, many of the articles made available are through news websites and social media. For the purpose of the research, many of these outlets cannot be used in the research due to lack of credibility.

It is necessary to note that there has often been a joint collaboration between Iran and Pakistan to crush Baloch nationalism. To elaborate, during the Iran-Iraq war, Iraq supported the Balochistan Liberation Front, a militant group that came to exist after the invasion of Balochistan by Iran. The group was supported by Iraq in retaliation to Iran support of the Kurds in Iraq. This led to further suppression of Baloch by Iranians, in addition to further cooperation between Iran and Pakistan. Both countries were determined to crush Baloch resistance and to maintain territory. The two countries also

made the claim that a liberated Balochistan can give the Soviet Union access to the Indian Ocean, this demotivated Western countries from supporting the Baloch national movement (Dashti, 2017). This could be plausible given that some allege that the Soviet Union assisted in the establishment of the Balochistan Liberation Army during the Soviet-Afghan War (Wright-Neville, 2010). In 2007, Iran began construction of a 10-foot-high, 700-kilometer-long wall along its border with Pakistan. In 2013, Iran and Pakistan signed a pact sharing responsibility for combating drug smugglers and militants operating across the shared border of Balochistan, making it easier to extradite prisoners (Farooq, 2013).

These repressions only lead to a larger sense of nationalism amongst the Baloch, who now felt even more alienated from Pakistan and Iran. Therefore, while the research mainly focuses on comparing assimilation policies in Iran and Pakistan, it is necessary to note that there has been joint cooperation between the two nations to “assimilate” or suppress Baloch nationalism.

2.4 Conclusion

In summary and based on the review of the literature, Baloch nationalism can be explained in the three major ways (Hutchinson, 2017). To begin with, a bond that is shared amongst an ethnic group has helped create a desire to establish a state. Secondly, state power has always found a way to oppress Baloch nationalism as any Baloch groups that have attempted to do so have always been labeled as rebels or terrorists and have been prosecuted accordingly. This only intensified the sense of nationalism amongst the Baloch. Thirdly, preferential treatment of majority groups often forces the Baloch minority to seek comfort in the idea of nationalism. In addition, the literature on Baloch nationalism allows the reader to understand the difference in the level of secondary resources available, where there is more literature written on Baloch in Pakistan than Baloch in Iran. This could create a potential for error in the research.

In addition, the findings indicate there are three main drivers of Baloch nationalism in modern-day Balochistan: the Gwadar port, the natural gas, and representation in government. Balochistan continues to suffer from economic and development grievances. One of the most important issues in the modern-day conflict by Baloch is the development of port Gwadar. The issue continues to appear in almost every literature written on Baloch insurgencies. The Chinese-funded project aims to transform Gwadar into a major transportation hub. However, the Pakistani government has failed to involve the Baloch in the development process. The project is run entirely

by the federal government and has offered little job to the Baloch who have been struggling with high unemployment and poverty levels. In addition, the government's officials illegally sold land around Gwadar and hence making a tremendous impact. This further angered the Baloch over the annexation of their land.

As for assimilation, it is clear in the literature that the go-to method by both Iran and Pakistan has been ruthless coercion and forced assimilation. This is exemplified through disappearances, executions, kidnapping, torturing, deprivation of language and culture, and punishment for those associated with Baloch nationalism. In addition, both Iran and Pakistan have attempted to weaken Baloch nationalism through dividing and conquering where they have weakened the national groups from within. Both countries have also used religion as a way to assimilate the Baloch and discourage secular nationalism.

Chapter 3 Research Methodology and Research Methods

3.1 Methodology

As explained in the literature review, political violence by Baloch nationalists has posed a real issue for both the governments of Iran and Pakistan. Baloch nationalist violence includes tactics such as riots, terrorism, kidnapping and violence against a variety of targets that include government forces, civilians, and other government-allied groups. On the other hand, governments of both Pakistan and Iran have resorted to violent repression of the Baloch, using both state resources (police and military) as well as paramilitary proxies, such as the frontier corps in Balochistan.

Given that the research attempts to create a comparison between assimilation methods in Iran versus Pakistan and how they contribute towards political violence, it is only natural to measure the different kinds of violence conducted by Baloch separatists, and whether assimilation measures taken by the two states are a contributing factor to the violence. For the purpose of the research, a comparative analysis methodological approach will be employed. Furthermore, given that the major indicators to assess my research (for example, socioeconomic data, political representation, number of attacks by the militants against civilians/government) it is also important to employ a methodological approach using content analysis and quantitative analysis in order to present a credible thesis. In addition, secondary source data analysis, mainly discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, as well as grey literature which will be presented in the discussion section.

Quantitative analysis examines the statistical, mathematical, or numerical analysis of data collected through polls, surveys, or pre-existing data (Earl, 2010). The proposed research will look at databases that rely on longitudinal data, they are i) the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) (<https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/>), which is maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland; and ii) the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (<http://ucdp.uu.se/>), which is maintained by the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at the Uppsala University.

Comparative Analysis is a methodological approach that identifies and explains the differences and similarities between cases using concepts that are applicable in more than one case. There are three main types, large N- studies (many cases), small N- studies (small cases), and single N-studies (one case) (Halperin & Heath, 2016). The

proposed research looks at small N-study group, given that the thesis explores Baloch nationalism in Iran and Pakistan.

Content Analysis is the systematic analysis of textual information. This can be done by looking at official documents such as government reports and administrative reports, cultural documents such as newspaper articles or editorial magazines, and personal documents such as letters, diaries, and emails. Content analysis provides researchers with the opportunity to employ an unobtrusive method of data collection, which allows them to get around problems such as the Heisenberg Effect (the tendency of people to change their behaviour under observation) (Halperin & Heath, 2016). This is absolutely necessary for the proposed research given the lack of literature available on Baloch Nationalism and to properly provide data needed to measure independent variable x (x = different approaches to assimilation) and for dependent variable y (y = level of political violence).

3.2 Methods

3.2.1 Quantitative Analysis

The research will violent/terrorist attacks by Baloch against the governments of Pakistan or Iran, and the number of attacks against civilians for the periods from 2004-2017. The information will be extracted from available databases: Global Terrorism Database (<https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/>) and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (<http://ucdp.uu.se>).

Based on the University of Maryland website, the Global Terrorism Database “was designed to gather a wide variety of etiological and situational variables pertaining to each terrorist incident. Depending on availability of information, the database records up to 120 separate attributes of each incident, including approximately 75 coded variables that can be used for statistical analysis” (GTD, 2018). As for START, the methodology of data collection is coding “news reports which contain information about individuals killed or injured. The search is done globally, with “intelligent indexing” used for further filtering when feasible. The results are then evaluated by human coders. Because many of these duplicate coverage of the same incident or report on incidents which fall outside of UCDP’s inclusion criteria, approximately 10,000-12,000 events are coded annually.” (START, 2018). These databases include the number of conflicts since 2004 to modern day, their methodology of data collection is reliable, and they identify the targets affected by the violent attacks.

It is important to note that the data available is mainly from the years 2004 to 2017. Importantly, the incidents are separated as: i) state-based violence (against the government), non-state violence (against other non-state actors), and one-sided violence (against civilians). It is important to note that in order to limit the research scope and due to lack of data, the research will focus on the current conflict which started in 2004 for Balochistan, and 2005 for Iran. In addition, the research only observes political violence executed by the most impactful militant groups in Pakistan and Iran (impact = number of attacks, size of attack, and number of death). For the case of militant groups in Pakistan, It is vital to note that while there are several groups in the region fighting for the same cause, Balochistan Liberation Army and the Baloch Republican Army are the largest in term of impact. In addition, both groups are supposedly run by the largest and most influential Baloch tribes in the region, the Marri and the Bugti. As for the case of Iran, there is currently only one active group in Iran, Jaish Al Adl. However, the research also examines Jundollah because it was the only active militant group between the years 2003 – 2010. Harakat Ansar Iran was dismissed from the research since the group was only active for the year 2012-2013 (Merat, 2014).

3.2.2 Content Analysis

In addition, the research will examine information published by news agencies mainly in Iran, Pakistan, and Baloch related news agencies such as <https://tribune.com.pk>, <https://balochwarna.com>, <https://thebalochnews.com>, and *Dawn*. Furthermore, information on the grievances faced in Balochistan will be extracted from Bengali's book *A Cry for Justice* (2018) which summarizes data and information on Baloch demographics, socioeconomic participation, and infrastructure gathered from government documents. In addition, historical documentation will also be considered for content analysis. An examination of the methods in which the governments have attempted to assimilate Baloch will be performed in order to understand whether the attempts have caused an upsurge in political violence, or that the attacks occur irrelevant of assimilation approaches.

3.3 Limitations

3.3.1 Validity

Given that the methodology of the research is quantitative analysis, it is necessary to examine the validity of the research. Validity refers to the degree to which one can draw definite conclusions from the research results, and whether these results

can be applied to other similar cases (Halperin & Heath, 2016). To elaborate, validity examines whether the research is likely to achieve the outcomes it set out to achieve. In this research, given that the resources used are from public historical accounts, literature, in addition to numbers retrieved from databases, it is most likely that the research will be valid and successful in achieving its research aim. The research will positively prove the correlation between the dependent variable (level of political violence) and the independent variable (different approaches to assimilation). The result of the findings can be used in later research when addressing Baloch political violence or Baloch nationalism. However, there are limitations in regards to validity since the thesis does not contain any immediate interaction with key Baloch militant leaders or officials from the governments of Pakistan and Iran. Another limitation is the possibility of key documents or facts being withheld due to the sensitivity. To elaborate, both states could possibly be withholding demographic and economic information on Baloch that could further feed into the research.

3.3.2 Reliability

Based on Halperin & Heath (2016), reliability refers to the ‘repeatability’ or ‘consistency’ of one’s findings. The reliability of a study depends on: i) coder stability, the consistency of coding the same data in the same way over a period of time, ii) reproducibility, the extent in which the coding schemes lead to the same text being coded in the same by more than one coder, and iii) objectivity, the extent in which different coders who are coding the same material will come to the same coding decision. For this research, the information will be mainly extracted from historical events, from secondary literature review, from the Global Terrorism Database and Uppsala Conflict Data Program. Therefore, repeatability is guaranteed given that the prospect researcher will rely on similar sources. However, it is essential to note that given the reliability of the research is limited to potential changes in the future. Another concern is the margin of error presented due to lack credibility of resources, given that some of these resources are made available by the Pakistani (score 117/180 in the corruption perception index for the year 2017) and the Iranian government (score 130/180 in the corruption perception index for the year 2017).

3.3.3 Generalizability

Generalizability examines whether the findings are applicable in other research settings other than their original research. This research mainly examines the case of

ethnic nationalism in countries that are considered highly political and violent, and how ethnic nationalism feeds into the violence. While the findings are going to be limited to Baloch in Iran and Pakistan, there are several cases where minority groups are living in a similar context (ex; Kurds in Iraq and Turkey). Therefore, the methodology used in my research can be reused, and my findings can be referenced for benchmarking purposes or comparative analysis. This positively impacts the generalizability of my research. However, unlike most minority groups, the Baloch live in highly controlled countries in terms of media content. This provides less coverage and global concern of the Baloch cause. In addition, Baloch in Iran live in a country that is considered contestant to a great chunk of the Western world. Unlike other ethnic groups, there is less content and context available on Baloch. Other limitations on my research are my inability to interview Baloch in Pakistan or Iran or to conduct a survey/poll. This is due to the travel restriction imposed on UAE citizens, specifically those working in the diplomatic corps.

3.4 Ethical Issues

The researcher conducted an investigation that did not involve human subjects. Therefore, no human subjects approval was required from the Office of Research. A Waiver for Human Subjects Research was submitted to Dr. Brendon Cannon (Thesis Supervisor) on 17/10/2018.

Chapter 4 Research Results

This chapter contains the data analysis and findings of this thesis. In doing so, it is useful to remind the reader of the independent variable x (x = different approaches to assimilation), and the dependent variable y (y = level of political violence).

4.1 Different Approaches to Assimilation

Referring to section 1.3.4, the thesis defined the below indicators as a measure for independent variable x (x = different approaches to assimilation):

- **Indicator 1: Public Investment in Balochistan:** federal government expenditure on Balochistan
- **Indicator 2: Political Representation:** political representation of Baloch in government
- **Indicator 3: Natural Mineral wealth redistribution:** redistribution of wealth extracted from the region back into the region
- **Indicator 4: Social Welfare discrimination:** compare the poverty level in Balochistan with other provinces in Iran and Pakistan, look at freedom to use language, civil rights
- **Indicator 5: Government response to the Baloch Nationalist Movement:** the nature of the government response to the Baloch movements or violence

4.1.1 Different Approaches to Assimilation: Pakistan

In terms of federal government public investment in Pakistan (indicator 1), there is a significant contradiction in Pakistani policy when it comes to Balochistan. For example, Balochistan is the richest province in terms of mineral resources, yet the poorest in terms of development. Data from the year 1970 onwards testifies that there was a general neglect of Balochistan by the Government of Pakistan. Between 1970 and 1990, per capita growth was 0.3 percent. Gross Regional Product growth in Balochistan from 2000 to 2011 has been reported at 2.8 percent (Bengali, 2018). Although Balochistan witnessed 5.9 percent growth in the 1980s due to four major public investments in the province, the next two decades from 1990 to 2010 witnessed no major investments by the Government of Pakistan in the province, leading to further decline. The Pakistani governments average federal “Public Sector Development Plan” allocation for development in Balochistan from 1989-90 to 2015-16 constitutes less than 6 percent of total federal Public-Sector Development Plan allocations, despite being the

largest and wealthiest (in terms of natural resources) province in Pakistan (Bengali, 2018). This exemplifies Pakistan's marginalization and exploitation of the province.

Politically the Baloch are underrepresented in Pakistan (indicator 2). There are representational imbalances found in Pakistan's bicameral national legislature (national assembly and senate). Although Balochistan comprises 44 percent of Pakistan's land, Balochistan only has 17 seats in the 342-seat National Assembly. This is due to the fact that the population is representative of only five percent of the population. This reality limits Baloch influence in the Assembly and renders Baloch voices ineffective. On the other hand, the Senate provides equal representation to all provinces; 23 seats for each province. However, the Senate does not possess significant powers in important matters such as fiscal policy and bills. Furthermore, Bengali (2018) notes that all provinces more or less have the same functions and departments, and each province needs a minister for each department. Yet, there are 40 Ministers in Punjab and only 15 in Balochistan. This highlights the clear imbalance in the political representation of the Baloch in the federal government as well as in their own province.

In terms of indicator 3, wealth from natural resources extracted from Balochistan is not reciprocally pumped back into the region. For example, natural gas was first discovered in Baloch in the year 1952 at Sui, Balochistan. Between 1955 and 1969, the average share of gas output by Balochistan stood at 91 percent. With the discovery of gas in other provinces, the share has declined to 21 percent (2005-2014). However, the absolute quantity of gas extraction at Sui continued to rise from 1, 535 million metric cubic feet in 1955 to peak production at 387,368 million metric cubic feet in 2001. However, not even an ounce of gas was supplied to Balochistan until 1982 (Bengali, 2018). And from 1983 to 2000, Balochistan share in total national gas consumption was only 2 percent. After 2000, gas shares rose to over 7 percent only, despite the fact that Balochistan is the largest province in Pakistan.

It is important for the reader to refer back to the Gwadar port issue mentioned in Chapter 2. According to Gare (2006), Gwadar port in Balochistan is the region's only deepwater port and is wholly under the control of the central government. The redistribution of wealth into Balochistan and to the Baloch is very minor, this is reflected in terms of job acquisition. Out of the 600 jobs created, only 100 low-wage jobs were reportedly filled by Baloch.

In his study, Bengali (2018) examined deficits in social protection in Balochistan (indicator 4). For example, the Benazir Income Support Programme which was a federal government scheme established in 2008 in order to assist economically stressed

families. As presented in the table below, Balochistan's share was a paltry 3.7 percent, which is lower than its population share of 5.1 percent. Although Balochistan is the poorest province in Pakistan, yet its share in the social safety net support is lower than its share of the population (1.5 Million).

Table 3: Number of Benazir Income Support Program Beneficiaries and Amounts Disbursed by Province (2014-2015)

Province/Territory	Number of Beneficiaries	Share (%)	Amounts Paid (Billion Rs)	Share (%)
Punjab	1, 849, 764	36.7%	32, 323.1	36.5
Sindh	1, 719, 339	34.1%	30, 075.9	34
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	1, 034, 012	20.5%	18, 311.5	20.7
Balochistan	188, 949	3.7%	3, 291.1	3.7
FATA	108, 664	2.2%	1, 919.7	2.2
Azad Jammu and Kashmir	96, 368	1.9%	1, 707.4	1.9
Gilgit-Baltistan	41, 542	0.8%	728	0.8
Islamabad	7, 880	0.2%	136.4	0.2
Total	5, 046, 518	100	88, 491	100

(Bengali, 2018)

In addition, the selections made as part of the Programme within Balochistan were biased (Bengali, 2018). The programme reportedly focused on families that were situated in certain areas while neglecting families that lived in isolated settlements. This reportedly creates perceived oppression and marginalization amongst the Baloch, in addition to feelings of neglect by the central government.

In terms of the imbalance in services, sources indicate there is a misrepresentation of the Baloch in the Pakistani civil service. This limits job opportunities. Additionally, the availability of civil service in Balochistan is reported to be weak. To elaborate, the number of federal posts available in Balochistan is 140, the average number of posts occupied falls between 40 and 48. Furthermore, the majority of the police force in Balochistan is federal, which weakens the provincial police representation (Bengali, 2018). In addition, the central governments found a window of opportunity to post federal officers in provincial posts in Balochistan, further limiting Baloch representation in the government. While the central government claims that this is based on the incompetency of Baloch applicants, there were positions that required little or no education and are essentially unskilled labor (Bengali, 2018). These positions were without any Baloch domiciled personnel.

Pakistan's multidimensional poverty index for the year 2016 indicates that nearly 39 percent of Pakistanis live in multidimensional poverty, with the highest rates of poverty in Balochistan. Fully 70 percent of people in Balochistan live in multidimensional poverty. The report also found that decreases in multidimensional poverty were slowest in Balochistan and that poverty levels had actually increased in several districts in Balochistan during the past decade. In addition, the 2018 United Nations Development Program reports that Balochistan has further fallen down in terms of sustainability, with 96 percent living with less than US\$2 per day. Balochistan ranked first in terms of poverty, while Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa ranked second with 49 percent living with less than US\$2. The difference between the poorest province (Balochistan) and the second poorest is that there are almost 47 percent more people living with under \$2 per day in Balochistan.

In terms of education, the Index (2016) explains that education attainment is highest in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (inhabited by Pashtun), followed by the Punjab province. On the other hand, Balochistan scored the lowest in the index. In addition, the literature states numerous times that the Baloch language is banned in schools. Balochistan is the only province in Pakistan where government schools do not teach the ethnic language of the province, the most widely spoken native language outside the Pashtun-majority areas, Balochi is only taught in some private schools in the region. Furthermore, it is rather difficult to locate books written in Balochi. Balochi literature had gradually disappeared due to constant raids by the Frontier Corps who labeled these books as "extremist literature", although most of them were poetic and folklore. Bookstores in the province's Makran belt have not sold Balochi books since 2014 (Ali, 2015).

Despite all the grievances, violent repression has been the order of the day when it comes to Pakistan's reaction to expressions of Baloch nationalism (indicator 5). The government of Pakistan has employed the Frontier Corps to control Baloch nationalism. There are several reports documenting the disappearances or killing of Balochs from different walks of life (Sundlee, 2014). The International Voice for Baloch Missing Persons states that more than 18,000 Baloch are currently unaccounted for, with more than 2,000 killed between 2001 to 2013 (Nazish, 2014). In 2014, the Voice for Baloch Missing Persons reports that 463 were forcibly disappeared, out of whom 157 were tortured to death (The Nation, 2016). The Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) reports that from August 2011 to January 2012, 56 Baloch people are known to have been murdered and dumped on roadsides, while 23 bodies from missing persons were

discovered in different parts of Balochistan in January 2012 (Shams, 2013). In addition, the BBC reported in 2016 that nearly 1,000 dead bodies of student and political activists, journalists, and suspected armed separatists were found in Balochistan province over the past six years. This was supported by the Federal Ministry of Human Rights, which states that at least 936 dead bodies have been found in Balochistan since 2011. Most of the dumped bodies were found in areas where the Baloch movement had roots, such as Quetta, Qalat, Khuzdar, and Makran (BBC, 2016). In a series of interviews by The Diplomat, families of the kidnapped or killed explained that the bodies of the victims clearly suffered torture. Some bodies were missing their heart, lungs, intestines, eyeballs, fingers. The families explain that the Frontier Corps do this with the aim of spreading fear amongst the Baloch, however, it has made them more resilient and more persistent in their call for succession (Nazish, 2014).

4.1.2 Different Approaches to Assimilation: Iran

The same indicators were used to evaluate assimilation approaches of the Iranian government towards the Baloch.

- **Indicator 1: Public Investment in Balochistan:** federal government expenditure on Balochistan
- **Indicator 2: Political Representation:** political representation of Baloch in government
- **Indicator 3: Natural Mineral wealth redistribution:** redistribution of wealth extracted from the region back into the region.
- **Indicator 4: Social Welfare discrimination:** compare the poverty level in balochistan with other provinces in Iran and Pakistan, look at freedom to use language, civil rights
- **Indicator 5: Government response to the Baloch Nationalist Movement:** the nature of the government response to the Baloch movements or violence.

Public investment figures by the Iranian regime in Balochistan (indicator 1) are scarce and difficult to locate. However, based on a survey of the literature, it can be extrapolated that the Baloch in Iran continue to struggle from little government investment to tackle natural or environmental issues that continue to infest the region. To elaborate, the Iranian Ministry of Energy announced in 2015 that Balochistan was facing a severe water crisis due to a shortage of water. However, the government has reportedly done little to assist in water management (Radio Farda, 2015). In addition,

the province continues to struggle from sandstorms that have arisen in recent years. These sandstorms have resulted in chronic health issues for the people of the region. Balochistan currently has the highest rate of respiratory health issues in Iran. However, despite the severity of the situation, the region has no specialized clinics for respiratory issues (Radio Farda, 2015). According to Doshouki (2016), the per capita budget for development and expansion allocated for Balochistan over the past 27 years has been the lowest in Iran. The development budget of Balochistan is less than 0.001 percent of the total national budget. The majority of the budget is spent on security and policing of the province.

In terms to political representation (indicator 2), the Baloch have almost no guaranteed representation in the Iranian government. To elaborate, the Iranian Parliament currently has 207 constituencies, including a total of 5 reserved seats for the religious minorities recognized by the constitution. Amongst these religious minorities, there are 2 seats for Armenians and one for Assyrians, one for Jews and one Zoroastrians. There are no seats reserved for the Sunni minority, including the Baloch. The rest of the 202 constituents are from the largest electoral districts, and they exclude Balochistan (International Federation of Human Rights, 2003; US Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2007).

In terms of natural mineral wealth redistribution (indicator 3) and similar to the situation in Pakistan, Iran's Balochistan holds significant reserves of gas, gold, copper, oil, and uranium, and has a 1,000-kilometre coastline at the gates of the Arabian Gulf (Zurutuza, 2011). However, unlike Pakistan, Iran's Balochistan remains widely unexplored and the province contributes to less than 1 percent of gross national product (Doshouki, 2016). While wealth from Pakistan in Balochistan is widely being exploited, some of the wealth is being reinvested in Balochistan. While insignificantly and in smaller quantities than the central government, the wealth extracted from Balochistan in Pakistan is being reinvested in the province. On the other hand, Balochistan in Iran is yet to receive wealth from its own reserves, given that Iran is yet to explore potential in the province.

With regards to the fourth indicator, the social welfare condition in Balochistan is dismal. The literacy rate in Sistan and Balochistan is the lowest in Iran. In 2015, around 200,000 children and adolescents were deprived of access to education. Only 50 percent of students enrolled in school graduate from high school, and out of the 3.3 million university students, the Baloch account for around 2,000 (Zurutuza, 2011). In addition, university graduates struggle to secure employment. While there is no public

document available to support his claim, Hussain Ali, a representative of Zahedan in Iran's parliament stated "nearly 80 percent of people in Sistan and Balochistan province are living in poverty" (Mikrofonnews, 2018). The Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) published a report that labels Balochistan as the province with the lowest rate of economic participation in the country. IRNA also states that the real rate of unemployment in this province is between 35-40 percent (Doshouki, 2016).

In terms of Iran's response to Baloch nationalism (indicator 5), according to Amnesty International, Iran executed at least 1,481 people between years 2004 to 2009, and the Voice for Baloch Missing Persons has claimed that around 55 percent of the executed people were Baloch (Zurutuza, 2011). The executed included activists, journalists, and militants. The Voice for Baloch Missing Persons claimed that "the Baloch in Iran have endured the highest concentration of death penalties handed down as a percentage of population in the world for nearly a decade under the Islamic regime" (Zurutuza, 2011). In 2005, a Baloch insurgency broke out in Iran and has thus far caused the death of 295 people, 25 of them being citizens (Zurutuza, 2011).

4.2 Political Violence

As for the dependent variable y (y = level of political violence), the results of the findings are presented in tables 4 through 6. It is important to note the following:

- One-sided violence refers to attacks against civilians by various Balochi nationalists and non-state armed actors
- Non-state violence refers to attacks against non-state groups by various Balochi nationalists and non-state armed actors
- State-based violence refers to attacks against the state by various Balochi nationalists and non-state armed actors

For the case of Pakistan, the level of political violence is analyzed based on the number of attacks against various targets (listed above) by the Balochistan Liberation Army and the Baloch Republican Army. As for Iran, the level of political violence is analyzed based on the number of attacks against various targets (listed above) by Jundollah, and Jaish Al Adl.

In reference to chapter 3.2.1, the research only observes political violence executed by the most impactful militant groups in Pakistan and Iran (impact = number of attacks, size of the attacks, and the number of deaths). For the case of militant groups in Pakistan, it is vital to note that while there are several groups in the region fighting


for the same cause, Balochistan Liberation Army and the Baloch Republican Army are the largest in term of impact. In addition, both groups are supposedly run by the largest and most influential Baloch tribes in the region, the Marri and the Bugti. As for the case of Iran, there is currently only one active group in Iran, Jaish Al Adl. However, the research also examines Jundollah because it was the only active militant group between the years 2003 – 2010. Harakat Ansar Iran was dismissed from the research since the group was only active for the year 2012-2013 (Merat, 2014).

In reference to chapter 3.2.1, the data of violent attacks by Baloch militant groups in Pakistan and Iran for the periods from 2004-2017 is extracted from available databases: Global Terrorism Database (<https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/>) and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (<http://ucdp.uu.se>). These databases include the number of conflicts since 2004 to modern day, their methodology of data collection is reliable (please refer to chapter 3.2.1), and they identify the targets affected by the violent attacks.

4.2.1 Political Violence in Pakistan

The Balochistan Liberation Army opposed the government of Pakistan and aims to establish an independent state.

Chart 1: The Balochistan Liberation Army, Number of Deaths




(UCDP, n.a)

Examining the chart above, it is safe to state that the majority of the attacks are state-based. They peak in the period between 2007-2008, showing a death toll of 83 state officials. The likely reason for this were the tremendous political changes that took

place in Pakistan in the year 2007. When then-President Musharraf (2001-2008) suspended the Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry, a wave of protests spread throughout the country. Importantly, Chaudhry was a Balochi and served as an advocate general of Balochistan. The general public, in addition to the Baloch, perceived him as the "only hope in the country" (AmamiWeb, n.a). After intense public pressure, Musharraf reinstated Chaudhry in July 2007. In October 2007, Musharraf won the elections but was challenged by the Supreme Court and Chief Justice Chaudhry. Musharraf declared emergency rule, appointed a new Supreme Court, and dismissed Chaudhry again (BBC Timeline, 2018). This further aggravated protestors throughout Pakistan, especially the Baloch, given that Chaudhry was the strongest and most influential Baloch representative in the government.

The Baloch Republican Army originated as a private militia of the previous leader of a Baloch tribal leader Nawab Akbar Bugti, who was also the leader of the Jamhoori Watan Party. Like the Balochistan Liberation Army, it also calls for further autonomy.

Chart 2: The Baloch Republican Army, Number of Deaths



(UCDP, n.a)

Violence by the Baloch Republican Army began in 2007 with a death toll of 143 state officials. The incident happened after the death of Nawab Akbar Bugti in 2006, who died at the hands of the advancing Pakistani military. His death triggered violent protests to which the Pakistani government responded with gunfire (Gall, 2006). Coupled with the suspension of Chief Justice Chaudhry, it is likely that the violence by the Baloch Republic Army was triggered by these events.

The table below presents a brief on the number of deaths caused by Baloch militant groups in Pakistan.

Table 4: Summary of Political Violence by Baloch in Pakistan between 2004 and 2017


	One-Sided Violence	Non-State Based Violence	State Based Violence	Total # of Deaths
Baloch Liberation Army	31	26	503	560
Baloch Republican Army	0	0	327	327

(UCDP, n.a)

4.2.2 Political Violence in Iran

Jundollah is a militant organization operating in Iran's Sistan-Balochistan province. The group has claimed that its objectives is to protect the human rights, culture, and faith of the ethnic Baloch people against the government of Iran. The leader of the group has already denied separatists intentions.

Chart 3: Jundollah, Number of Deaths




(UCDP, n.a)

The activities of Jondullah began in 2003, where it was the first group to introduce suicide bombing (Vatanka, 2011). Although initially triggered because of underdevelopment, poverty, and misrepresentation, Jundollah eventually stopped their activities in 2010 with the execution of the group's leader and founder, Abdolmalek Rigi (BBC, 2010).

Jaish Al Adl was created in 2012 out of the ashes of the previous militant group, Jondullah. Unlike Jondullah who mainly focused on defending human rights of Baloch, Jaish Al Adl broadens its objective to include all Sunni groups throughout the world.

Their attacks escalate in 2013 as a result of Iran's involvement in Syria, where the group has continuously warned the Iranian government to stop its involvement in Syria, and to stop its crimes against the people of Syria and the Sunni population of Iran (Paraszczuk, 2010). Attacks of Jundollah are ongoing, and the last one took place in 2017. The attacks are against state-officials and state-departments, with the ultimate goal of defending the rights of Sunnis in Iran, and globally.

Chart 4: Number of Deaths, Jaish Al Adl



(GTD, n.a)

The table below presents a brief on the number of deaths caused by Baloch militant groups in Iran.

Table 5: Summary of Political Violence by Baloch in Iran between 2004-2017

	One-Sided Violence	Non-State Based Violence	State Based Violence	Total # of Deaths
Jundollah	25	0	270	295
Jaish Al-Adl	3	0	61	63

(UCDP, n.a & GTD, n.a)

4.2.3 Conclusion of Political Violence Findings

Although there are more attacks by Baloch in Pakistan than there are in Iran, it is necessary to highlight that since the invasion of Balochistan by Pakistan in 1948, resistance by Baloch has risen. Violent Baloch National movements have formed in

1963 in Pakistan as a result of policy and constitutional changes that weakened Balochistan's autonomy. This explains that Balochistan from the very start has been resistant Pakistan invasion of the territory. As for Iran, based on the databases and on gray literature available, Jundollah operations began in 2003 and a result of further repression of the Baloch in terms of ethnicity and religion and failure to assimilate.

In addition to the mentioned above indicators and findings, it is necessary to explain how the research concluded its finding. While the Baloch militant in Pakistan mainly demand further autonomy or succession from Pakistan due to their heightened sense of Nationalism due to a common remembered history, Jundollah has expressed in their rhetoric that they are defending ethnic Baloch and Iranian Sunni Muslims from state repression. The literature confirms that the Baloch are also driven by Iran's failure to assimilate Sunni minority into the government. Therefore, Baloch are experiencing marginalization and failure to assimilate through ethnic and religious spectrums. Authors, such as Ghaffari (2009), believe that the insurgency in Iran will reduce tremendously if the Baloch were given more political representation. Therefore, unlike the case for Balochistan in Pakistan, political violence by insurgents in Iran is a result of Iran's failure to assimilate the ethnic and religious minority.

Chapter 5 Discussion

5.1 Answering the Research Question

The research question is:

To what extent are the differences in the Iranian and Pakistani approaches to assimilation of their Baloch minorities a factor in the level of political violence in the two countries?

The analysis of the data collected as part of this thesis project reveals that the approaches taken by both the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran to assimilate their Baloch minorities have contributed significantly to the level of Baloch political violence. However, a further finding reveals that the Pakistani assimilation approach has been more of a factor in the level of political violence among the Baloch in Pakistan than assimilation efforts of the Baloch in Iran. Given the above findings, the author notes that the hypothesis, *assimilation approaches of Baloch minority in the Islamic Republic of Iran have contributed to Baloch political violence more than they have in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan* has been largely proven to be correct. Evidence to support this is:

1. Assimilation Efforts as a Factor in Political Violence by Baloch Militants: Pakistan
 - a. While Balochistan is the richest province in terms of natural resources, it continued to be the most underdeveloped province with no major public investments and little social protection (Bengali, 2018). It is also the poorest province in Pakistan.
 - b. Representation of Baloch is rather mild in the government. Balochistan receives only 17 seats in the National Assembly out of a total of 342 seats. Furthermore, Baloch occupies a small chunk of federal jobs, even within the Baloch province.
 - c. Low participation of Baloch within the military and the federal government has led to a general of isolation amongst the Baloch.
 - d. Perceived exploitation of Balochistan by Pakistan due to the expansion of natural gas exploration and the construction of Gwadar port, with little benefit returning to the province. The Baloch have continuously expressed their dissatisfaction by continuously attacking and targeting pipelines. However, the Pakistani government is still unwilling to agree to the Baloch demands (Kupecz, 2012).
 - e. The literature (Kupecz, 2012; & International Crisis Group, 2008; Khan, 2009) explain that the military's harsh response to Baloch uprisings has led to

exasperated of violence. The literature and the findings clearly indicate that there are more 18,000 Baloch currently unaccounted for, and more than 2000 killed between the year 2001 and the year 2013. The gray literature examined proves that there are cases of torture, disappearance, and dumping of Baloch bodies. The literature argues that the central government pursues military solutions to lingering socioeconomic and political problems, which intensifies the sense of nationalism within the Baloch.

2. Assimilation Efforts as a Factor in Political Violence by Baloch Militants: Iran
 - a. Although Baloch in Iran have adopted the wider Iranian culture, it continues to struggle from underdevelopment, no representation in government, mild public investments in the region, and minor public services and facilities.
 - b. The violent crackdown on Baloch and systematic oppression by the government as detailed in the literature review, have led to political violence in Iran. It is key to note that the Iranian government retaliation almost always tends to further aggravate Baloch militants. Rather than peacefully attempting to reconcile the Baloch, the Iranian government tends to violently respond. Rather than assimilation, this creates further alienation.
 - c. Lack of public investment in Sistan-Balochistan, where the province continues to lack basic needs such as water management systems and specialized clinics. Furthermore, Iran's Balochistan is rich in gas, gold, copper, oil, and uranium reserves. However, the Iranian government has done little extract the richer from the province. This has kept the province at steep poverty and underdevelopment. This has led to weakened social welfare, where Balochistan has the highest illiteracy rate in Iran, and the highest unemployment rates.
 - d. Lack of political representation, where the Baloch have no guaranteed representation in the government, since there are no seats reserved for the Sunni minority. However, there are 2 seats for Armenians and one for Assyrians, one for Jews and one Zoroastrians.
 - e. Another important element that was found in both the literature and the finding, is that Iran attempts to instill fear in Baloch through public executions. The Voice for Baloch Missing Persons has stated that 55 percent of those executed between the years 2004-2009 were Baloch. They included activists, journalists, and militant. As a result of these repercussions, insurgencies eventually broke out in Balochistan.

3. Assimilation efforts as a Factor in Pakistan vs. Iran

- a. Baloch militant groups in Iran have already stated that their objectives are not separatist, but they are to protect and expand the rights of the Sunni minority in Iran. Given the context, should Iran successfully assimilate Sunni Muslims and provide equal rights, the political violence by the Baloch militant groups could recede.
- b. Baloch militant groups in Pakistan have called for independence in Baluchistan since its occupation by Pakistan forces in 1948. While assimilation failure has contributed to political violence by Baloch in Pakistan, it is vital to note that there has been a call for Baloch independence predates the Baloch sense of oppression. To elaborate, the Baloch have called for independence in 1947, a year before Pakistan's occupation of Balochistan. In addition, Baloch militant groups, as explained in the START database, have indicated that their objective is further autonomy/independence

5.2 Conclusion of Discussion

In conclusion, it is necessary to return to the indicators stated in Chapter one to measure independent variable x (x = different approaches to assimilation) which are, Public Investment in Balochistan, Political Representation, Social Welfare, Natural Mineral wealth vs development in the province, Poverty, Government retaliation to the Baloch Nationalist Movement. After providing the data above, in addition to the literature, it is clear to see that both the Pakistani and Iranian governments have failed in assimilating the Baloch in any of the above indicators. However, the call for independence (1947) has existed even before the Baloch could experience the effects of marginalization. On the other hand, Baloch Militants in Iran have stated that their objectives are not separatists, but they are to protect the interest of the Sunni minority. Therefore, while both countries have failed to assimilate Baloch, it is more of a factor towards political violence in Iran than it is in Pakistan, given that Pakistan's political violence is also fueled by a sense of nationality that predates Pakistan's occupation of the province.

Chapter 6 Conclusion

In conclusion, neither the government of Iran nor Pakistan have succeeded in their assimilation approaches to the Baloch people. The research has successfully answered the question *to what extent are the differences in the Iranian and Pakistani approaches to the assimilation of their Baloch minorities a factor in the level of political violence in the two countries* by examining available literature, providing content analysis, and examining databases on political violence in both Iran and Pakistan. The answer is that failure of assimilation has contributed towards aggravating political violence in both Iran and Pakistan. However, it is key to note that it is more of a factor in Iran than it is in Pakistan. To recap, Pakistan has vested some effort into assimilating the Baloch in some cases, whereas Iran has chosen to isolate the region completely. To elaborate, the Pakistani government has publicly invested in the Balochistan region given its geopolitical importance, however, the wealth produced by these investments are mainly kept to the central government. This is exemplified in the Gwadar port and Sui gas facility. On the other hand, Iran has chosen to not invest in the Baloch region. As for political representation, the Baloch in Pakistan are guaranteed representation in both the national assembly (17 seats out of 342) and 23 seats in the Senate in Pakistan. However, they are not guaranteed any seats in the case of Iran. In terms of redistribution of wealth, the wealth extracted from Baloch – although on a minimum level – is redistributed in Balochistan in Pakistan. Whereas in Iran, the central government has done little to extract wealth from the province from the get-go. As for social welfare, Balochistan in both Pakistan and Iran are considered to be the least developed region/province in the two countries. In examining political violence, aggression by Baloch in Pakistan has begun since the occupation of Balochistan by Pakistan in 1948. Baloch have been resistant towards Pakistan since then. As for Iran, based on the databases and on the literature available, the groups began their operations as a result of repression and oppression of Sunnis. Furthermore, the Baloch militant groups in Pakistan have mainly demanded further autonomy or succession from Pakistan, whereas militant groups in Iran have announced their objectives to be the defense of ethnic Baloch and Iranian Sunni Muslims from state repression.

6.1 Implications

The research indicates that faulty assimilation policies could be a contributing factor towards political violence by ethnic minority groups. Therefore, it is necessary to

implement assimilation tools that are not likely to isolate, alienate, or oppress ethnic minority groups. Failure to assimilate can lead towards a greater sense of nationalism amongst minority groups. This is applicable with other minority groups, such as the Kurds in Iraq.

It is also necessary to indicate that the research also finds that nationalism is not necessarily only a result of failure of assimilation policies; indeed, it is often the result of the existence of a common history, common ancestry and a historical land. However, feelings of nationalism can be further realized with the failure of assimilation policies.

For the case of Iran, there are other politically violent minority groups such as the Ahvaz. Understanding political violence as exhibited by Baloch minority groups as a result of faulty assimilation can aid Iran in quelling violence as exhibited by other minority groups, and reconciling with the groups.

As for Pakistan, the sense of nationalism in Baloch is mainly due to a sense of yearning for the Balochistan historical land and autonomy. This sense of nationalism is further enlarged because of faulty assimilation policies. In order for the government to reconcile with the minority group, further autonomy and positive assimilation is the most viable solution.

6.2 Future Research Directions

In chapter 1, the research identified the problem as occurring in Pakistan and Iran only. However, it is key to note that the division of historical Balochistan encompassed three countries, the third being Afghanistan. Future research could identify whether political violence by Baloch exists in Afghanistan, and whether faulty assimilation policies could be a contributing factor.

In chapter 3, the research limits the scope to encompass only two militant groups in Pakistan, and two militant groups in Iran. Expanding the scope of research could perhaps yield different results. In addition, the indicators for political violence were limited to one-sided violence, state-based violence and non-state violence. Examining other indicators, such as types of attacks and targets of attacks could be fruitful to expanding the findings of the research.

For future research on the topic, it is necessary to look at other factors that could be leading to political violence. This could include external political events, the influence of foreign countries on ethnic minorities, and other triggers that could be contributing towards the political violence of Baloch.

6.3 Researcher's reflections

Gathering information on links between assimilation and Baloch violence in Iran and Pakistan has proven to be difficult. I had to rely mainly on databases and literature reviews of assimilation, and literature reviews on political violence as well as finding a link between them through deductive reasoning. While I failed to interview relevant academics or experts due to time constraints and travel difficulties, interviewing experts could have substantially assisted me in my deductive reasoning process.

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