Side channels in the McEliece PKC

Falko Strenzke; Erik Tews; H. Gregor Molter; Raphael Overbeck; Abdulhadi Shoufan

doi:10.1007/978-3-540-88403-3_15

Side channels in the McEliece PKC

Falko Strenzke, Erik Tews, H. Gregor Molter, Raphael Overbeck, Abdulhadi Shoufan

Electrical Engineering

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

62 Scopus citations

Abstract

The McEliece public key cryptosystem (PKC) is regarded as secure in the presence of quantum computers because no efficient quantum algorithm is known for the underlying problems, which this cryptosystem is built upon. As we show in this paper, a straightforward implementation of this system may feature several side channels. Specifically, we present a Timing Attack which was executed successfully against a software implementation of the McEliece PKC. Furthermore, the critical system components for key generation and decryption are inspected to identify channels enabling power and cache attacks. Implementation aspects are proposed as countermeasures to face these attacks.

Original language	British English
Title of host publication	Post-Quantum Cryptography - Second International Workshop, PQCrypto 2008, Proceedings
Publisher	Springer Verlag
Pages	216-229
Number of pages	14
ISBN (Print)	3540884025, 9783540884026
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-88403-3_15
State	Published - 2008
Event	2nd International Workshop on Post-Quantum Cryptography, PQCrypto 2008 - Cincinnati, OH, United States Duration: 17 Oct 2008 → 19 Oct 2008

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume	5299 LNCS
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)	1611-3349

Conference

Conference	2nd International Workshop on Post-Quantum Cryptography, PQCrypto 2008
Country/Territory	United States
City	Cincinnati, OH
Period	17/10/08 → 19/10/08

Keywords

Post quantum cryptography
Side channel attack
Timing attack

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-540-88403-3_15

Cite this

Strenzke, F., Tews, E., Molter, H. G., Overbeck, R., & Shoufan, A. (2008). Side channels in the McEliece PKC. In Post-Quantum Cryptography - Second International Workshop, PQCrypto 2008, Proceedings (pp. 216-229). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 5299 LNCS). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-88403-3_15

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abstract = "The McEliece public key cryptosystem (PKC) is regarded as secure in the presence of quantum computers because no efficient quantum algorithm is known for the underlying problems, which this cryptosystem is built upon. As we show in this paper, a straightforward implementation of this system may feature several side channels. Specifically, we present a Timing Attack which was executed successfully against a software implementation of the McEliece PKC. Furthermore, the critical system components for key generation and decryption are inspected to identify channels enabling power and cache attacks. Implementation aspects are proposed as countermeasures to face these attacks.",

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Strenzke, F, Tews, E, Molter, HG, Overbeck, R & Shoufan, A 2008, Side channels in the McEliece PKC. in Post-Quantum Cryptography - Second International Workshop, PQCrypto 2008, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 5299 LNCS, Springer Verlag, pp. 216-229, 2nd International Workshop on Post-Quantum Cryptography, PQCrypto 2008, Cincinnati, OH, United States, 17/10/08. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-88403-3_15

Side channels in the McEliece PKC. / Strenzke, Falko; Tews, Erik; Molter, H. Gregor et al.
Post-Quantum Cryptography - Second International Workshop, PQCrypto 2008, Proceedings. Springer Verlag, 2008. p. 216-229 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 5299 LNCS).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

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AU - Tews, Erik

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AU - Overbeck, Raphael

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N2 - The McEliece public key cryptosystem (PKC) is regarded as secure in the presence of quantum computers because no efficient quantum algorithm is known for the underlying problems, which this cryptosystem is built upon. As we show in this paper, a straightforward implementation of this system may feature several side channels. Specifically, we present a Timing Attack which was executed successfully against a software implementation of the McEliece PKC. Furthermore, the critical system components for key generation and decryption are inspected to identify channels enabling power and cache attacks. Implementation aspects are proposed as countermeasures to face these attacks.

AB - The McEliece public key cryptosystem (PKC) is regarded as secure in the presence of quantum computers because no efficient quantum algorithm is known for the underlying problems, which this cryptosystem is built upon. As we show in this paper, a straightforward implementation of this system may feature several side channels. Specifically, we present a Timing Attack which was executed successfully against a software implementation of the McEliece PKC. Furthermore, the critical system components for key generation and decryption are inspected to identify channels enabling power and cache attacks. Implementation aspects are proposed as countermeasures to face these attacks.

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KW - Side channel attack

KW - Timing attack

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Strenzke F, Tews E, Molter HG, Overbeck R, Shoufan A. Side channels in the McEliece PKC. In Post-Quantum Cryptography - Second International Workshop, PQCrypto 2008, Proceedings. Springer Verlag. 2008. p. 216-229. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). doi: 10.1007/978-3-540-88403-3_15

Side channels in the McEliece PKC

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