On the reputation of agent-based web services

Babak Khosravifar, Jamal Bentahar, Ahmad Moazin, Philippe Thiran

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

13 Scopus citations

Abstract

Maintaining a sound reputation mechanism requires a ro bust control and investigation. In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic analysis of a reputation mechanism that objectively maintains accurate reputation evaluation of selfish agent-based web services. In this framework, web services are ranked using their reputation as a result of provided feed back reflecting consumers' satisfaction about the of fered ser vices. However, selfish web services may alter their public reputation level by managing to get fake feedback. In this paper, game-theoretic analysis investigates the payof fs of dif ferent situations and elaborates on the facts that discourage web services to act maliciously.

Original languageBritish English
Title of host publicationAAAI-10 / IAAI-10 - Proceedings of the 24th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 22nd Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference
Pages1352-1357
Number of pages6
StatePublished - 2010
Event24th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 22nd Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, AAAI-10 / IAAI-10 - Atlanta, GA, United States
Duration: 11 Jul 201015 Jul 2010

Publication series

NameProceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Volume3

Conference

Conference24th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 22nd Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, AAAI-10 / IAAI-10
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityAtlanta, GA
Period11/07/1015/07/10

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