On the argumentative agent types and negotiation

Mohamed Mbarki, Jamal Bentahar, Bernard Moulin

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

We propose a framework for argumentation-basednegotiation where Agents' constraints such as budget and time play a key role in determining the set of offers agents can make. Each offer is supported by arguments and each agent tries to achieve an agreement using arguments to persuade the opponent to make concession. An agreement is achieved when the last offer is accepted. Two concession and two acceptance strategies are identified and their different combinations result in four types of negotiating agents. The paper discusses completeness, Pareto optimality, and Nash equilibrium results with respect to these types.

Original languageBritish English
Title of host publicationNew Trends in Software Methodologies, Tools and Techniques Proceedings of the Tenth SoMeT_11
Pages169-182
Number of pages14
DOIs
StatePublished - 2011

Publication series

NameFrontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications
Volume231
ISSN (Print)0922-6389

Keywords

  • Acceptance strategy
  • Agent type
  • Argumentation
  • Completeness
  • Concession strategy
  • Nash equilibrium
  • Negotiation
  • Pareto optimality

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