TY - JOUR
T1 - Military Assistance as Political Gimmickry? The Case of Britain and the Newly Federated United Arab Emirates after 1971
AU - Yates, Athol
AU - Rossiter, Ash
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.
PY - 2021
Y1 - 2021
N2 - What motivates states to provide others with military assistance? Traditional explanations naturally focus on the security interests of the sender state. But could domestic considerations–intra-party politics, for example–also be a factor in some cases? This analysis, which examines the British decision to send a Military Advisory Team [MAT] to the newly federated United Arab Emirates [UAE] in 1971, answers in the affirmative. It demonstrates that the MAT was primarily, albeit not exclusively, a means by which the British government of Prime Minister Edward Heath could stave off sharp criticism from fellow Conservative politicians that under his leadership that Britain was cutting and running from its overseas responsibilities. Furthermore, because the MAT was in inception a political tool, its military utility in assisting the UAE, or the influence Britain derived from its presence, was minimal at best and counterproductive at worst.
AB - What motivates states to provide others with military assistance? Traditional explanations naturally focus on the security interests of the sender state. But could domestic considerations–intra-party politics, for example–also be a factor in some cases? This analysis, which examines the British decision to send a Military Advisory Team [MAT] to the newly federated United Arab Emirates [UAE] in 1971, answers in the affirmative. It demonstrates that the MAT was primarily, albeit not exclusively, a means by which the British government of Prime Minister Edward Heath could stave off sharp criticism from fellow Conservative politicians that under his leadership that Britain was cutting and running from its overseas responsibilities. Furthermore, because the MAT was in inception a political tool, its military utility in assisting the UAE, or the influence Britain derived from its presence, was minimal at best and counterproductive at worst.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85103819817&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1080/09592296.2021.1883864
DO - 10.1080/09592296.2021.1883864
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85103819817
SN - 0959-2296
VL - 32
SP - 149
EP - 167
JO - Diplomacy and Statecraft
JF - Diplomacy and Statecraft
IS - 1
ER -