Abstract
This paper attempts to understand whether there is alignment between executive remuneration and shareholder interests in publicly listed companies in Australia. The issue is analysed over three distinct stages of an economic cycle, and the panel fixed effects method is used to estimate the performance-remuneration models. The study finds that the long-term compoents of the remuneration package would highly incentivize CEOs and executive directors. Still, the fixed salary component exerts no such enticement for them to maximize shareholders’ wealth. This new information could be useful for Australian firms as well as for firms in Asia Pacific countries due to the close relationship they share with the Australian firms.
Original language | British English |
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Pages (from-to) | 260-272 |
Number of pages | 13 |
Journal | Asia Pacific Business Review |
Volume | 28 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 2022 |
Keywords
- APAC
- Australian Securities Exchange
- Company performance
- executive remuneration
- financial performance
- fixed effects