Cyber-physical attacks on power distribution systems

Abdelrahman Ayad, Hany Farag, Amr Youssef, Ehab El-Saadany

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

22 Scopus citations

Abstract

This study investigates the impacts of stealthy false data injection (FDI) attacks that corrupt the state estimation operation of power distribution systems (PDS). In particular, the authors analyse FDI attacks that target the integrity of distribution systems optimal power flow (DSOPF) in order to maximise the system operator losses. The branch current state estimation method is implemented to accurately model the PDS, and convex relaxations are applied to the DSOPF model. The effects of the FDI attacks are analysed on the IEEE 34-bus unbalanced radial distribution system, with distributed energy resources (DERs) along the feeder. A 24 h DSPOF is performed, and the results depict the changes in the voltage profile and the additional power injection from the DERs, which consequently lead to the increase of the DSOPF cost.

Original languageBritish English
Pages (from-to)218-225
Number of pages8
JournalIET Cyber-Physical Systems: Theory and Applications
Volume5
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jun 2020

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Cyber-physical attacks on power distribution systems'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this