TY - GEN
T1 - An efficient and truthful leader IDS election mechanism for MANET
AU - Otrok, Hadi
AU - Mohammed, Noman
AU - Wang, Lingyu
AU - Debbabi, Mourad
AU - Bhattacharya, Prabir
PY - 2007
Y1 - 2007
N2 - In this paper, we consider the problem of increasing the effectiveness of an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) for a cluster of nodes in ad hoc networks. To solve such a problem, a head cluster is elected by the nodes to handle the detection service. Current solution elects a leader randomly without considering the energy level of nodes. Such solution is vulnerable to selfish nodes that do not provide IDS service to others while at the same time benefiting from others' services. From our experiments, selfish nodes reduce the effectiveness of an IDS since less packets are inspected over time. Here, we are modeling a distributed, truthful, and efficient mechanism for electing a leader IDS that handles the detection process in a cluster. Our solution is able to balance the energy among all the nodes and increase the overall lifetime of an IDS in a cluster. In our model, incentives are given in the form of reputation to encourage the nodes to cooperate in the leader election process. The reputation is used to track the cooperative behavior of nodes where miss-behaving nodes are punished by withholding the cluster's services. Reputations are calculated based on the truth-telling mechanism design known as Vickrey, Clarke, and Groves (VCG). Our analysis prove that truth-telling is the dominant strategy for all the nodes and therefore efficiency is guaranteed. Finally, simulation results show that our mechanism improves the performance of an IDS in analyzing packets and punishes misbehaving nodes.
AB - In this paper, we consider the problem of increasing the effectiveness of an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) for a cluster of nodes in ad hoc networks. To solve such a problem, a head cluster is elected by the nodes to handle the detection service. Current solution elects a leader randomly without considering the energy level of nodes. Such solution is vulnerable to selfish nodes that do not provide IDS service to others while at the same time benefiting from others' services. From our experiments, selfish nodes reduce the effectiveness of an IDS since less packets are inspected over time. Here, we are modeling a distributed, truthful, and efficient mechanism for electing a leader IDS that handles the detection process in a cluster. Our solution is able to balance the energy among all the nodes and increase the overall lifetime of an IDS in a cluster. In our model, incentives are given in the form of reputation to encourage the nodes to cooperate in the leader election process. The reputation is used to track the cooperative behavior of nodes where miss-behaving nodes are punished by withholding the cluster's services. Reputations are calculated based on the truth-telling mechanism design known as Vickrey, Clarke, and Groves (VCG). Our analysis prove that truth-telling is the dominant strategy for all the nodes and therefore efficiency is guaranteed. Finally, simulation results show that our mechanism improves the performance of an IDS in analyzing packets and punishes misbehaving nodes.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=47049129930&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/WIMOB.2007.4390872
DO - 10.1109/WIMOB.2007.4390872
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:47049129930
SN - 0769528899
SN - 9780769528892
T3 - 3rd IEEE International Conference on Wireless and Mobile Computing, Networking and Communications, WiMob 2007
BT - 3rd IEEE International Conference on Wireless and Mobile Computing, Networking and Communications, WiMob 2007
T2 - 3rd IEEE International Conference on Wireless and Mobile Computing, Networking and Communications, WiMob 2007
Y2 - 8 October 2007 through 10 October 2007
ER -