A timing attack against Patterson algorithm in the McEliece PKC

Abdulhadi Shoufan, Falko Strenzke, H. Gregor Molter, Marc Stöttinger

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

43 Scopus citations

Abstract

The security of McEliece public-key cryptosystem is based on the difficulty of the decoding problem which is NP-hard. In this paper we propose a timing attack on the Patterson Algorithm, which is used for efficient decoding in Goppa codes. The attack is based on the relation between the error vector weight and the iteration number of the extended Euclidean algorithm used in Patterson Algorithm. This attack enables the extraction of the secret error vector with minimal overhead. A countermeasure is proposed and verified for a FPGA implementation.

Original languageBritish English
Title of host publicationInformation Security and Cryptology - ICISC 2009 - 12th International Conference, Revised Selected Papers
Pages161-175
Number of pages15
DOIs
StatePublished - 2010
Event12th International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology, ICISC 2009 - Seoul, Korea, Republic of
Duration: 2 Dec 20094 Dec 2009

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume5984 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference12th International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology, ICISC 2009
Country/TerritoryKorea, Republic of
CitySeoul
Period2/12/094/12/09

Keywords

  • code-based cryptography
  • post quantum cryptography
  • Side channel attack
  • timing attack

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