Abstract
We consider Gillette’s two-person zero-sum stochastic games with perfect information. For each k∈ N= { 0 , 1 , … } we introduce an effective reward function, called k-total. For k= 0 and 1 this function is known as mean payoff and total reward, respectively. We restrict our attention to the deterministic case. For all k, we prove the existence of a saddle point which can be realized by uniformly optimal pure stationary strategies. We also demonstrate that k-total reward games can be embedded into (k+ 1) -total reward games.
| Original language | British English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 263-293 |
| Number of pages | 31 |
| Journal | International Journal of Game Theory |
| Volume | 46 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 1 Mar 2017 |
Keywords
- Cyclic games
- Mean payoff
- Stochastic game with perfect information
- Total reward
- Two-person
- Zero-sum
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