A nested family of k -total effective rewards for positional games

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3 Scopus citations

Abstract

We consider Gillette’s two-person zero-sum stochastic games with perfect information. For each k∈ N= { 0 , 1 , … } we introduce an effective reward function, called k-total. For k= 0 and 1 this function is known as mean payoff and total reward, respectively. We restrict our attention to the deterministic case. For all k, we prove the existence of a saddle point which can be realized by uniformly optimal pure stationary strategies. We also demonstrate that k-total reward games can be embedded into (k+ 1) -total reward games.

Original languageBritish English
Pages (from-to)263-293
Number of pages31
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume46
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Mar 2017

Keywords

  • Cyclic games
  • Mean payoff
  • Stochastic game with perfect information
  • Total reward
  • Two-person
  • Zero-sum

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